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1. INTRODUCTION
America's retirees are faced with a potential financial disaster.
Economic security in retirement has long depended on Social Security,
private savings,

and

employer-provided retirement plans.'

Although

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, frolik@pitt.edu.
1. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the ThreeLegged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 93 8,
939 (2007).
*
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2
much attention has been paid to the financial problems of Social Security
and the lack of private saving for retirement, 3 little attention has been
paid to an alarming development in employer-provided retirement
plans: the likely inability of retirees during the long years of their retirement
to manage successfully their retirement funds accumulated in 40 1(k)
and similar accounts. Asking individuals to husband a lump-sum payout
from a 401(k) retirement account for the 20 to 30 years of retirement as
they physically and mentally decline is a recipe for disaster. Unless we
provide a more secure way to stretch retirement dollars into the twilight
of retiree lives, we can expect to see more and more elderly retirees slide
into poverty.4 The solution is to create federally guaranteed lifetime
annuities that retirees can purchase with the fuinds accumulated in their
401(k) retirement accounts.
We as a society have set up a funding system for retirement that
assumes retirees will be able to successfully manage their IRAs for the
20 or 30 years of retirement. We know, however, that most retirees will
not be able to perform this task. Some will lack the basic intelligence to
do so. Others, although generally smart enough, will lack the knowledge
to manage finances. Some will lack the emotional temperament to take
on the risk, oversight, and planning needed to stretch out the payments
from an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) over their lives. Some
will be fine managing an IRA at age 65 but will lose the ability due to
physical decline. Finally, millions of aging IRA owners will slip away
mentally into the land of dementia. We can do better. But first we must
recognize the impending failure of the current world of 401 (k) accounts.

2. See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECuRITy REFORM
(2000); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reform: Lessons
from Private Pensions, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 297 (2007).
3. Befort, supra note 1, at 962.
4. Currently about 10% of those age 65 and older have incomes below the official
poverty line. David Pratt, Retirement in a Defined ContributionEra: Making the Money
Last, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1091, 1135 (2008). However, 22% have incomes under
150% of the poverty line, indicating how precarious their finances are. Id If future retirees
have less retirement income, the percentage who will have income below the poverty
line could rise dramatically.
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11. THE DECLINE OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN

The last decade has seen a sea change in the nature of employee
retirement plans. In the past, defined benefit plans predominated . The
details of such plans varied, but the critical feature was a guaranteed
pension for life. Typically the amount of the pension was determined by
a formula: number of years worked, times some fixed percent, times the
average earnings in the year or two before retirement . An employee, let
us call him Alex, upon retirement would receive a fixed pension for life.
Assume that pursuant to the formula used by his employer, Acme Inc.,
Alex was due a pension of $36,000 per year. In actuality, Alex would
likely not receive $36,000 each year for life.7 First, if he was married,
his wife, Aliya, would have a right to have Alex's pension paid until the
second to die of Alex and Aliya.8 Because a two-life annuity can be
expected to pay out longer than a single-life annuity, the plan likely
5. The decline of the defined benefit plan has been well documented. Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 469 (2004); see also
Henry H. Drummonds, The Aging of the Boomers and the Coming Crisis in America's
Changing Retirement and Elder Care Systems. 11ILEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 267, 276-77
(2007); ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., AN
UPDATE ON 40 1(K) PLANS: INSIGHTS FROM THE 2007 SCF 1-2 (2009), http://crr.bc.
edu/images/stories/Briefs/ib _5.pdf, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09291, DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS: SURVEY RESULTS OF THE NATION'S LARGEST PRIVATE
DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN SPONSORS (2009), available at http:Ilwww.gao.gov/new.items/
d09291 .pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

6. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 457.
7. Assume that in 1960, at age 25, Alex started work for Acme, Inc. and worked
continuously there for the next 40 years, until he turned 65-the retirement age under Acme's
defined benefit retirement plan. That plan promised an employee a pension equal to the
number of years worked, times 1.5% per year, times the employee's last year' s income.
Alex earned $60,000 in his last year at Acme. His retirement pension is calculated: 40
(years of employment) x 1.5% =60% x $60,000 (final year's wages) =a $36,000 pension
each year for life. Note that the typical defined benefit plan formnula is back loaded because
the final year's compensation is a significant determinate of the value of the pension.
Workers who switch employment and participate in a defined benefit plan in each job
have their pensions calculated on their earniings at a combination of ages when their
compensation was lower. Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income-The
Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality, 11IELDER LIJ. 37, 54-55 & n.56 (2003).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (2006). Aliya could waive that right. Id § 1055(c)
(2006).
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would reduce the annual payment to reflect the probability that a joint
annuity would be paid for more years. 9 Second, Acme could, and almost
certainly would, have "integrated" the plan with Social Security.'0
Integration permits an employer to reduce the amount of a pension to
reflect the employer's annual payroll tax paid to Social Security on
behalf of the employee."
With his pension from Acme and his Social Security benefits, assume
Alex has an annual income for life of around $40,000. Not a princely
sum, but this is enough to place Alex in the top quarter of income for
those people age 65 or older.'12 More importantly, he has the comfort
that his income is secure. First, his Social Security benefits will be paid
regardless of any financial problems the program might face. No one
has suggested that current retirees should expect to have their benefits
cut. Some advocate lower benefits for future retirees, but even the
Cassandras who predict doom and gloom for Social Security concede
that the program can-or at least should-meet its obligations to those
3
currently retired.'1
Employees, like our fictional Alex, can also be confident that they will
receive their pensions for the remainder of their lives.'14 Because the
obligation to pay the pension rests with the employer who sponsored the
9. See id § 1055(d)(1) (2006).
10. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5)(D) (2006).
11. As Alex's employer, Acme was required to pay an amount equal to 6.2% of his
compensation up to the maximum wage tax amount, which in 2009 was $106,800. U.S.
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PuB. No. 05-10003, ELECTRONIC FACT SHEET: UPDATE 2010, at 1
(2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10003,pdf.
12. PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32697, INCOME AND POVERTY
AMONG OLDER AMERICANS IN2007, at 7 (2008), available at http://aging.senate.gov/crs/
pension35.pdf.
13. Befort, supra note 1, at 965; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The "PrudentRetiree Rule":
What To Do when Retirement Security Is Impossible?, I11LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 481,
488 (2007).
14. A defined benefit pension plan is not necessarily secure prior to retirement.
Even though the employee may be vested--have nonforfeitable benefits-absent collective
bargaining agreements, the employer retains the right to terminate or freeze the plan.
David Madland, The Politics of Pension Cuts, in EMPLOYEE PENSIONS: POLICIES,
PROBLEMS, AND) POSSIBILTIES 187, 191 (Teresa Ghilarducci & Christian E. Weller eds.,
2007). This is not an idle threat. According to Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
data, 700,000 employees had their fuilly funded defined benefit plans terminated between
2000 and 2005. Id Although the vested benefits of the participants in a terminated or
frozen plan are secure, they do not accumulate additional benefits unless the employer
sponsors a new retirement plan or unfreezes the existing plan. Id
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defined benefit plan, the employer plan sponsors are obligated annually
to fund the plan at a rate actuarially calculated to be sufficient to pay the
future pension obligations. 15 Of course, because an employer may not
have put enough money in its defined benefit pension plan, it might be
underfunded with the result that it cannot pay all the promised benefits.
Even if the plan is adequately funded when an employee retires, it is
possible that over the 20 or 30 years of an employee's retirement the
plan might become so underfunded that it is unable to pay the obligated
pensions. Still most retirees need not fear for the loss of their pensions
because defined benefit plans must buy insurance from the federally
operated Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 16 The PBGC,
in turn, uses these premiums to pay pensions to defined benefit plan
pensioners in the event the plan lacks the financial wherewithal to do so.
To be sure, there are limits on the amount of pension benefits that the
PBGC will pay,' 7 but most retirees can expect the PBGC to pay them
their fuill pensions.1 8
Though the pension is essentially guaranteed, protection against its
erosion by inflation is not. Almost no pension provided by a private
sector employer increases over time to account for the inflation that
occurs over the 15, 20, or even 30 years of an individual's retirement.
For example, if our retiree, Alex, lives 20 years after he retires and
inflation averages 2.5% per year, by the time he dies, the purchasing
19
power of his pension will have declined by 50% because of inflation.
There is nothing a retiree can do about this other than hold back some of

29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1083 (2006).
Id § 1322 (2006).
17. Id § 1322(b)(1). in 2009 the maximum protected pension was $54,000 for an
employee who retired at age 65. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
PBGC Announces Maximum Insurance Benefit for 2009 (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.
The amount is higher for
pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/news-releases/2008/PrO9-03.html.
those who retire at a later age and less for those who retire when younger. Id.
18. Whether the PBGC will have sufficient assets to pay off all future claims is not
certain. See Adam E. Cearley, Comment, The PBGC:-Why the Retiree's TraditionalLife
Raft Is Sinking and How To Bail It Out, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 18 1, 183 (2006).
19. See Kathleen H. Czamey, Note, The Future of Americans' Pensions: Revamping
Pension Plan Asset Allocation To Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 's
Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 153, 162 (2004).
15.
16.
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the pension dollars received in early retirement years, invest them, and
use them to augment the inflation devalued benefits received in the later
years of retirement.
Offsetting that bit of bad news is that Social Security benefits are
indexed to inflation-the consumer price index to be exact-and so do
not diminish in value over an individual's life .20 The increases in Social
Security benefits can go far in alleviating the impact of inflation on a
retiree's income. If, for example, a retiree receives $30,000 per year
from a pension and $15,000 per year in Social Security benefits, a third
of the income is protected from loss in value due to inflation.
Unfortunately, the number of employees participating in defined
benefit plans is rapidly receding; an ever shrinking number of employees
are currently enrolled in defined benefit plans as fewer and fewer
employers sponsor such plans .2 The number of employees participating
in defined benefit plans fell from 27 million in 1985 to 19.5 million in
2008.2 In 1983, 62% of employees with a retirement plan participated
in a defined benefit plan; by 2007 only 17% did.2 In 1990, about 92,000
defined benefit plans existed.2 By 2009, the number had shrunk to just

under

29,000.25

Almost no employer is starting a defined benefit plan,

and many of those that have them are freezing them, meaning that
employees get the benefits they have earned but are not earning additional
benefits.2 The retreat from defined benefit plans reflects in part many
employers' concerns about the unpredictability and volatility of a
defined benefit plan's funding requirements.2
An employer's annual
funding requirement to a defined benefit plan depends in part upon
investment return on the funds in the plan. Because those returnis
fluctuate, the employer's annual funding obligation is neither predictable
nor consistent. As pension costs vary from year to year, so do the
20.
2 1.

See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (2006).
GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 23; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I'M SIXTY-

FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN To SAVE THEM 34 (2008).
22. PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL30122, PENSION SPONSORSHIP

AND PARTICIPATION: SUMMARY OF RECENT TRENDS 4 (2009), available at http:I/assets.

opencrs.com/rpts/RL30 122_20090911 .pdf.
23. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
24. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Madland, supra note 14, at 19 1.
27. Gordon T. Butler, American Paternalismand the One Fund Solution, 9 Wyo.
L. REv. 485, 509 (2009); Drumnmonds, supra note 5, at 296.
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employer's reported profits, thereby causing the business to appear to be
more volatile than it actually is. Competitive market pressure is another
reason for the decline of defined benefit plans, as employers seek to
lower the cost of labor.2 Even the administrative costs of operating a
29
defined benefit plan are cited as a reason for their disfavor with employers.
Defined benefit plans are being replaced by defined contribution
30
plans , in particular, 401(k) plans in the private sector, 403(b) plans by
tax-exempt organizations or public schools, and 45 7(b) plans for some
state and local governmental employees. 3'1 For brevity, this Article will
refer to 40 1(k) plans, but the discussion is equally applicable to 403(b)
and 457(b) plans. In 2006, almost 53% of private sector employees had
the opportunity to participate in a defined contribution plan, though only
43.2% chose to participate . 2
As the name suggests, a defined contribution plan guarantees that the
employer will contribute a defined amount to a retirement plan for the
employee. For example, each year the employer might be obligated to
contribute an amount equal to 5% of the employee's annual
compensation to a retirement fund to be credited for the benefit of the
employee. The traditional defined contribution plan operated as a single
investment portfolio under the direction of the plan trustees with each
employee having a subaccount that reflected the employee's
proportionate share of the total fund. Upon retirement the employee was
paid whatever was in that account, which consisted of the employer
contributions, any employee contributions, and the investment earnings
accumulated over the years that the plan was in effect 3.

28. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 21, at 37. "The simplest explanation for why firms
prefer 40 1(k) pension plans is the plain fact that they reduce pension costs. By providing
401(k) pension plans-and calling them pensions-firms can reduce their pension funding
expenses considerably." Id at 92.
29. William Handley Woolston, Whose Money Is It Anyway? The Casefor a Mortality
Discountfor Cash Balance Plan Early Termination Lump Sum Distributions, 10 U. PA.
J. Bus. & EmI'. L. 383, 430 (2008).
30. MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 1-2.
31. The plans take their names from the Internal Revenue Code sections that
govern them. See I.R.C. §§ 40 1(k), 403(b), 457(b) (2006).
32. PURCELL, supra note 22, at 6.
33. l.R.C. § 401.
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The traditional defined contribution plan has all but disappeared.
Today, the 40 1(k) plan reigns supreme. Created by Congress in 1978, it
was conceived as a means of supplementing other forms of pension
plans, particularly defined benefit plans.3 4 The 401(k) model soon
proved to be so popular that it began to replace other forms of defined
contribution plans and even caused some employers to abandon their
defined benefit plans. Employers found that they mitch preferred the
predictable funding requirements of 401(k) plans and even more appreciated
the shift of the investment risk to their employees. Meanwhile,
many employees liked the idea of taking charge of investing their
retirement fuinds. The result was that by 2007, 4011(k) plans had come to
represent over two-thirds of all employer-sponsored retirement plans .3 5
A 401(k) plan is a cash or deferred arrangement (CODA) plan that
permits participating employees to choose between either receiving a
cash payment or having a contribution made to a qualified retirement
plan and held in an account on their behalf. 36 If the employee accepts
the cash, then the employee realizes income and is taxed on it in the year
it was received. If the employee chooses the contribution to the plan,
then the employee is not taxed on either the value of the contribution or
the investment returns earned by the contribution held in an account in
the employee's name.3 The employer may, but need not, match some
amount of the employee's contribution, or the employer can make an
unmatched contribution to the employee's account.
A defined contribution plan does not guarantee employees that they
will receive any particular benefit. Rather, the plan only guarantees that
employees will receive the value of whatever is in their accounts
because the risk of the investment return rests with the employees.
Moreover, in almost all 401 (k) plans, employees direct the investment of
their accounts. The employer, as plan sponsor, selects a limited number

34. See id § 401(k); Ellen M. Doyle & Stephen M. Pincus, Restoring Retirement
Nest Eggs, TRIAL, Apr. 2009, at 46, 46.
35.

MUNNELL ET AL., supra note

5, at 2 fig.2.

See I.R.C. §401(k).
See id. Section 402(g) of the Internal Revenue Code limits the dollar amount
that an employee may contribute to a 40 1(k) account. The limit is annually adjusted for
inflation in $500 increments as measured by the cost-of-living index. Id. § 402(g)(4) (2006).
In 2009, the limit was S$16,500. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Announces
Pension Plan Limitations for 2009 (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0Jdl87833,00.htmnl.
36.
37.
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of investment alternatives, and subject to those limitations employees
have the ongoing responsibility to manage their 401(k) accounts.3
Although employees bear the investment risk of a 401(k) account-the
amount of their retirement fuind depends heavily on the investment
return on their account-they also have some control over that risk by
virtue of their managing the investments in the account.3
Upon retirement, employees have the option of leaving their accounts
in the 401 (k) plan or rolling it over, tax-free, into an IRA.4 Whichever
option they choose, they face two formidable financial planning problems
that will continue for the rest of their lives.
First, they must successfully invest the accounts for what is likely to
be 20 or more years of their remaining lives. 4'1 To maintain the value of
their retirement funds they must successfully invest them-not lose
capital-with the hope that the investment return will at least equal the
rate of inflation. As the financial collapse of the markets in 2008 has
demonstrated, however, even the modest goal of creating earnings equal

38. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). A good deal of criticism has been leveled at
the concept of employees directing the investments in their 401(k) accounts, most of it
justified. E.g., Yves Stevens, European and American Issues in Employee Benefits Law
Compared, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1189, 1231 (2008) (compiling excerpts from Burke
& McCouch, supra note 2, at 307-08; Samuel Estreicher & Laurence Gold, The Shift
from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans, I11LEWIS & CLARK L. REv.
331, 334-35 (2007); Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time To Admit the Failure of an EmployerBased Pension System?, 11ILEWIS &CLARK L. REv. 305, 312-13 (2007)).
39. Many employees make poor investment decisions-such as excessive investment
in the stock of their employer or failing to sufficiently diversify-that expose them to
unnecessary risks. James M. Poterba, Individual Decision Making and Risk in Defined
ContributionPlans, 13 ELDER L.J. 285, 297 (2005).
40. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(31I), 402(c)(8) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-1 C.B.
359. For the rollover to be tax-free, it must occur within 60 days of the date of the
separation from service of the employer that sponsored the 40 1(k) plan. I.R.C. § 402(c)
(2006).
41. In 2005, at age 65 the average life expectancy was 18.7 years; 20.0 years for
women and 17.2 years for men. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALT14 & HUMAN SERVS., DHHS PUB. No. 2009-1232, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008,
at 203 tbl.26 (2009), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datahushus8.pdf#026.
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to the rise in the cost of living may be difficult to achieve.4 Second,
they must spend their retirement funds at a rate that will not exhaust
them before they die, yet at an amount sufficient so that they will have
enough on which to live. This is even trickier than being a successful
investor. Although the two goals, investment returns that at a minimum
keep pace with inflation and taking distributions at a rate that neither
exhausts the fund nor leaves the retiree in poverty, can support each
other-good investing means more to spend while tempered withdrawals
maintain capital-the two goals are also in conflict. The more the
retiree withdraws to live on, the less there is to invest and so the smaller
the investment return.
Of course, almost all retirees who own a 40 1(k) account will also
receive Social Security retirement benefits. In some cases, those benefits
might very well exceed what they withdraw from their retirement accounts.
Even so, if during retirement they do not invest their retirement funds
wisely or spend them too freely, their later years will find them with
diminished income and a lower standard of living.
Whether retirees leave their money in their 401(k) accounts or roll it
over tax-free to IRAs, the investment returns on the funds are tax-free
until distributed. In return for this tax advantage, after retirement from
the employer who sponsored the 401(k) and after reaching age 70 1/2,
the retiree is required to take out an annual minimum distribution, which
is expressed as a percentage of the value of the 401(k) account or the
IRA."3 There is no requirement that mandated distributions be spent,
however. The retiree can take a distribution, pay the applicable income
tax, and save the remainder. One suspects, however, that many of those
taking out the minimum required annual distribution spend it because
they think of it as what they can "afford" to spend without risking
exhausting the fund, absent untoward investment losses.
111. POSTRETIREMENT FLAWS OF 4011(K) PLANS

The drawbacks of 40 1(k) plans are many, including lack of employee
participation, poor investment choices by employees, borrowing from
the 401(k) account, and cashing out the account when leaving a job
42. From January 4, 2008, to March 4, 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
declined from 12,800 to 6876, or by 46%. Dow Jones Industrial Average Closing Prices,
http://dowjonesclose.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 20 10).
43. See I.R.C. §401(a)(9) (2006).
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before retirement . What happens to these accounts after retirement has
attracted much less attention . 45 First, note that retirement is not quite the
right term because an employee does not have to retire-leave the
workforce-to access a 401(k) account. All distributions from a 401(k)
represent taxable income, but early distributions incur an additional 10%
excise tax.4 To avoid this penalty the employee must merely be age
59 1/2 or older and separate from service with the employer who
sponsored the 40 1(k) plan.4 For example, Betty, age 62, quits her job
with Acme. She takes a lump-sum distribution from her 401 (k) account,
rolls it over tax-free into an IRA, and goes to work for Beta Co. Though
still employed, she is free to take distributions from her IRA without
incurring an income tax penalty, but she will be taxed on the
distributions.
The right to take funds from a 401(k) account after retirement creates
potential temptations not to save the funds but to spend them or to use
them to pay off existing debts.4 Imagine an employee, Cathy, single,
age 66, who retires with a 401 (k) worth $400,000. She never earned
more than $60,000 per year during her 45 years of employment. For the
first time in her life, Cathy has access to a significant wealth, $400,000,
which, although in absolute terms may not seem like all that much, to
Cathy is a very significant sum. The temptation is great to spend some
of it, to reward herself after 45 years of daily toil. Perhaps after a
lifetime of used cars, she is eying that new $30,000 car. Or she may
want to fulfill her dream of owning a little condo in Florida at a cost of
$60,000. Even if Cathy desires nothing for herself, she may be tempted

44. Stabile, supra note 38, at 310-16. For a more far-ranging critique of 40 1(k)
plans, see WILLIAM WOLMAN & ANNE COLAMOSCA, THE GREAT 40 1(K) HOAX (2002).
45. See, e.g., Strengthening Worker Retirement Security: Hearing Before the H
Comm. on Education & Labor, I1I11th Cong. 77-82 (2009) (prepared statement of Matthew D.
Hutcheson, Independent Pension Fiduciary). Mr. Hutcheson has not a word to say about
the postretirement investment and management hurdles faced by retirees. Id. One
exception is Pratt, supra note 4, at 1137-42.
.R.C. § 72(t) (2006).
46.
47. Id.
48. Colleen E. Medill, The Retirement DistributionDecision Ten Years Later: Results
from; an EmpiricalStudy, 16 ELDER LIJ. 295, 316 & tbl.5. 1 (2009).
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to help her 88-year-old mother pay for the entry fee into a continuing
care retirement community at a cost to Cathy of $ 100,000.
The possibilities are endless, but Cathy's funds are limited. Any
substantial use of them will severely affect her future financial wellbeing. The $400,000 that seems so bountiful to her is not going to buy
her a lavish or even very comfortable lifestyle. An investor can take 4%
annually from a fund with about a 90% certainty of being able to withdraw
that percentage for the remainder of the investor's life.4 9 For Cathy, this
means she can withdraw about $16,000 per year. The amount will
modestly rise or fall depending on the investment return on the
$400,000, but if she takes out even 5% or 6% she significantly increases
the risk of exhausting the fund. 50 If Cathy succumbs to temptation and
spends $30,000 on a new car, her annual income is cut by $1200, or
$30,000 times 4%. If she spends $60,000 on a condo she loses $2400,
and if she gives her mother $100,000 her annual income drops by $4000.
Do recently retired employees often make large expenditures from
their 40 1(k) accounts? We do not know. But commonsense tells us that
many may buy a boat, a car, or pay for a special vacation. In short, they
"reward" themselves and celebrate their retirement. Some undoubtedly
spend a significant percentage of their 401 (k) accounts by "investing" in
a better house or vacation home. Others will have debts that they will
need to pay off. 5 'I Regardless of how much money is spent or what it is
spent on, however, the result is a diminution in future disposable income.
Upon their retirement, former employees who resist the temptation to
spend part of their 401 (k) accounts face the choice of whether to let their

49. Rande Spiegehnan, Spending Confidently in Retirement, SCHWAB CTR. FOR
FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/research_-

strategies/market -insightlretirement-strategies/plIan ning/sp endingccon fi dent lyinre
tirement.html (last visited Apr. 17, 20 10).
50. Id. Not everyone agrees that large initial withdrawals at the time of retirement
are necessarily unwise. "For some participants with high discount rates, large
initial withdrawals and a declining consumption profile as they age may be more attractive
than deferring consumption .. "Poterba, supra note 39, at 303--04. Another view is that
high discount rates reflect the emotional inability of the brain to reliably value the future
because "life is short and we want pleasure now." JONAH LEHRER, How WE DECIDE 91
(2009).
5 1. Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing
Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 167, 168 (2007).
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funds remain in their 401(k) accounts or roll them over into an IRA .
Many undoubtedly elect the rollover option to move their 401(k) funds
into an IRA, which makes sense because it frees them from the
employer-designated investment limits of their 401(k) plan. Even if the
employee were content to invest in the same manner as in the 401(k),
there is no reason not to at least create the possibility of new investment
choices by rolling over the funds into an IRA. Retirees who keep their
funds in their 401(k) accounts continue to have the right to roll them
over into an IRA at any time. All they have to do is request a distribution of
all the funds in their 401(k) accounts and place those funds into an IRA
within 60 days to avoid current taxation on the distribution.5 The IRA,
like the 401(k) account, will continue to enjoy tax-free status with only
distributions from the IRA being subject to the federal income tax.5
A decision by a retiree to roll over a 401 (k) account into an IRA raises
the question of where to roll over the funds. There is no shortage of
choices-mutual funds, banks, investment advisers, and investment
companies all compete for 401(k) account dollars. This is hardly a surprise
given the opportunity for fees and commissions for the investment
company or bank that holds the IRA. We know very little as to how
employees choose the repository of a 40 1(k) rollover. We do not know
whether they compare costs in the form of fees and commissions;
whether they are looking for financial advice, for convenience and ease
of access, for safety from fraud or embezzlement; or whether they respond
to advertisements, merely follow word-of-mouth advice, or investigate
and compare the choices. The motivations and reasons as to where they
roll over the accounts are unknown.
We do know that the choice of where to roll over the funds can be
crucial in terms of investment returns. Retirees who choose poorly and
obtain subpar investment returns suffer diminished incomes in their 20
or 30 years of retirement. We also know that the choice is not "one and
done." Hopefully, the retiree gains in investment sophistication during
retirement and as time passes invests the account more wisely and with

52.
53.
54.

See I.R.C. § 402(c) (2006).
Id § 402(c)(3).
Id § 408 (2006).
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greater insight than at the time of the rollover. Unfortunately, inertia
usually wins out over wisdom-assuming that retirees gain in
investment skill as they age-so that the initial investment decisions are
unlikely to be changed.5
Regardless of whether the employee retains the 401(k) account or rolls
it into an IRA, the individual must decide how best to invest the funds to
obtain high investment returns at an acceptable level of risk throughout
Of course, the need to make successful
the years of retirement.5
investment choices is not new because the employee faced the same
decisions when working. What is new is that the retired employee will
The annual minimum
be withdrawing funds from the account.
the congressional
70
1/2
57
reflects
after
age
that
is
required
distribution
view that the tax deferral was intended to assist the replacement of
income during retirement and not merely create an indefinite deferral of
taxation.5 The income tax regulations provide a schedule of how much
must be distributed each year-by percentage of the value of the IRAbased on the age of the IRA owner . 59 Absent investment losses, IRA
owners who only make the required annual minimum distribution will
60
not zero out the account before they die.
The required minimum distribution rules create a number of decisions
for the IRA owner. The owner must choose which assets should be
distributed to meet the required distribution. There are several options,
including distributing the most risky assets first, distributing assets
proportionally by asset class, taking an in-kind distribution, and either
liquidating equities or fixed-income investments first. The number and
55. Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation, 103
J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1995).
56. Because most retirees roll over their 401(k) account into an IRA, this Article will
refer to the retiree's IRA, but the discussion is equally applicable to a 401(k) account
retained by a retiree.
57. I.RC. § 401(a)(9) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9, Q&A (2) (2002) (Uniform
Lifetime Table).
58. STAFF OF J. Comm. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF

1986, at 710 (J. Comm. Print 1987).

59. Treas. Reg. § 1.40 1(a)(9)-9, Q&A (2). The annual required distribution is not
large enough to zero out the account, but it is taxable and does modestly reduce the dollar
amount in the account. The Uniform Lifetime Table lists the distribution period for ages up
to 11 5. Id. As a result, if the owner takes only the minimum distribution, much if not
most of the distribution will occur after the death of the owner.

60.

Id

NATAIE B. CHOATE, LIFE AND DEATH PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITs

41 (6th ed. 2006).
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complexity of the choices raised by the need to make annual distributions
strongly suggests that many older retirees will not be up to the task.
Yet even more distribution issues await. For example, do retirees
understand that IRA dollars should be spent only after they have spent
other savings in order to prolong the tax-free advantages of the IRA
funds? Although neither sophisticated nor arcane knowledge, it seems
probable that many retirees either do not know about it or do not follow
it. A retiree who owns appreciated securities outside the IRA may
hesitate to sell them because the sale will incur the capital gains tax even
though the rate in 2009 was capped at 15% for long-term capital gains.'
If, instead, the retiree takes out dollars from the IRA above the required
minimum, those dollars are ordinary income and so may be taxed at a
higher rate, and even worse, they no longer grow tax-free inside the
IRA. The habit of not selling stocks in order to defer taxation on
unrealized gain, although often a sound rule, may be the wrong choice
under these circumstances. Unfortunately, an aging retiree may not be
aware of this strategy.
A retiree who owns an IRA faces other choices that are difficult
because the "right" answer is often dependent on uncertain variables,
including future interest rates, future anticipated stock prices, the rate of
inflation, future income needs, and the life expectancies of the retiree
and the retiree's spouse. For example, in making the minimum
distribution, or any distribution, the retiree may have to decide whether
to cash in a corporate bond that pays 6% interest or distribute cash held
by the IRA. If the retiree believes that future interest rates are going up,
selling the bond makes sense because rising interest rates will lower the
value of the bond. If the retiree sells the bond but was wrong about
future interest rates, selling the bond was a mistake; instead the cash
held by the IRA should have been distributed. Of course, investors of
any age can guess wrong as to the direction of future interest rates, but a
wrong choice by a retiree results in a loss of capital-a nonreversible
choice with long-term financial consequences.

61. An asset owned for at least one year qualifies for long-term capital gains.
I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006). In 2009, long-term capital gains were taxed at a maximum rate
of 15%. See id § I1(h)(1)(C) (2006).
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Given the number of variables that impact retirees' choices as to how
to manage their rollover IRAs, it is unlikely that most are making
optimum choices. Even if they make a wise decision, it is rarely final.
Each year offers retirees another chance to make critical investment
and distribution choices that may improve their financial positions or
worsen them. Each year retirees can correct the mistakes of the past,
make fresh mistakes, reverse wise decisions previously made, or make
better choices. And this repeated need to choose continues throughout
the retiree's life-those 20 or 30 years stretching from retirement at age
65 to age 85, 95, or even 100.
IV. MANAGING AN IRA WITH DIMINISHED PHYSICAL CAPACITY

Many retirees will live to age 85 and beyond 6.

Unfortunately life for
those age 85 and older is not always a golden age; many suffer from the
loss of physical and mental capacity.6 It is estimated, for example, that
up to half of those age 85 or older suffer from dementia.6 Because of
declines in mental and physical capacity, many very old retirees are not
capable of effectively managing their financial affairs. In particular,
many will find themselves unable to make wise or even rational choices
about their finances.
In the coming years, millions of IRA owners-or 401(k) account
holders-will be age 85 or older and incur significant declines in their
mental and physical well-beings. The degree of decline will vary greatly.
Some will experience only physical declines, such as diminished
eyesight or a loss of physical strength. For these, the lucky elderly,
managing an IRA will not be much more difficult than when they were
younger. Many, however, will suffer serious declines in short-term
memory, vision, or hearing. Even so, they may still be mentally alert.
Short-term memory loss is a normal part of aging and does not signify a
loss of mental capacity or cognition . 65 Still, the loss of short-term
62.

In 2004, about 45% of those people age 65 were expected to survive until age

85.

ELIZABETH ARIAS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumAN SERVS., UNITED STATES LIFE
TABLES, 2004, at 3 tbl.B, 5 & fig.2 (2007), available at http://ww-w.cdc.gov/nchs/data/

nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56O-9.pdf.
63. LEWIS R. AIKEN, AGING: AN INTRODUCTION To GERONTOLOGY 32-61, 78-83

(1995).
64. THE MERCK MANUAL OF GERIATRICS 357 (Mark H. Beers & Robert Berkow
eds., 3d ed. 2000).
65. AIKEN, supranote 63, at 115-16.
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memory can impair the ability to manage an IRA as it becomes more
difficult to remember advice or to recall previous decisions. For
example, after a wide-ranging discussion with a financial adviser about
possible investment strategies, at the end of the meeting an older retiree
may not be able to remember what was decided or why it was thought to
be the best course of action. Even specific instructions, such as "sell
stocks x and y and buy bond z," may become muddled for those with
poor memories.
Declining vision is a common aspect of aging, but it is generally
correctable with glasses. Many elderly, however, experience macular
degeneration, a progressive nontreatable loss of core vision. 66 Some
67
afflicted by it can read with the help of technology, but many cannot.
Those who cannot read often find it very difficult to make intelligent
decisions about their investments. If coupled with a loss of short-term
memory, many elderly with vision problems find it impossible to
manage effectively their complex financial affairs. The loss of hearing
is another typical consequence of aging. Even with a hearing aid-too
often shunned for reasons of vanity-many elderly cannot hear well
enough to participate in multiparticipant conversations or may have
difficulty understanding more complicated topics because they fail to
hear critical terms.
Imagine an IRA owner, age 90, who cannot see well enough to read,
who has a hard time hearing even with a hearing aid, and who cannot
seem to remember things so that she forgets by the end of an hour
meeting what she was told at the beginning. Now imagine her engaging
in strategic decisions about her investments. The reality is that such an
individual is simply not up to the task of effectively managing her IRA.
Some elderly IRA owners who cannot hear or see well may be reluctant
to engage in meetings with financial advisers and other professionals for
fear that they will be unable to hear what is said, read what is presented
to them, or remember what was decided. Some likely conclude that it is
66.

Id. at 44.

67.
See DANIEL L. ROBERTS, THE FIRST YEAR: AGE-RELATED MAcuLAR DEGENERATION:
AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR THE NEWLY DIAGNOSED 64-70 (2006) (describing the

advantages and disadvantages of various low vision devices that assist people With mnacular
degeneration).
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better to stick with the status quo than to endure the embarrassment of
appearing unable to comprehend what is being discussed.
Many other very old IRA owners are very frail. They suffer from a
general physical decline in energy, mobility, flexibility, and strength.
Some suffer from a particular ailment, such as arthritis, but most are just
victims of old age and its inevitable physical decline. 68 That loss of
vigor and energy can sharply reduce the physical abilities of older
persons so that they literally do not have the energy necessary to manage
their investments. For a very old person, sleeping, resting, dressing,
eating, and personal grooming can take up most of the day.
Chronic illness is the fate of many elderly. 69 They suffer from conditions
such as diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and congestive heart failure that
rob them of the energy and concentration needed to be sophisticated
investors. Imagine an 84-year-old woman on dialysis. She devotes three
days per week to traveling to the dialysis center, enduring the dialysis,
and recovering from the effects].0 On the other days of the week, is she
really going to devote her limited time and energy to her financial
affairs? Will she have the concentration and energy to do so? Similarly,
someone with life-threatening emphysema is unlikely to be focused on
managing IRA investments. Given the prevalence of chronic illness
among the elderly, there are almost certainly thousands of IRA owners
with significantly chronic conditions that undercut their ability to
manage their IRAs.
Some elderly will have an acute illness, such as cancer, that will leave
them in pain, disoriented by drugs or other therapies, and much more
concerned about whether they will live than whether their IRAs are
overloaded with equities or which assets should be sold to provide cash
for the annual required minimum distributions. Of course, having an
acute illness is not necessarily a sign that an individual's ability to
handle an IRA is compromised or that, even if compromised, her ability
will not ebb and flow over time. Yet, as with other physical ailments and
conditions, acute illness may undercut financial planning capabilities
and result in lost opportunities or investment losses. In short, the variety
of possible physical declines that await aging IRA owners suggests that
68.

LEwis R. AIKEN, AGING AND LATER LIFE: GROWING OLD IN MODERN' SOCIETY

27-51 (2001).
69. Id at 55.
70. Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut. A Legal, Economic,
and Religious Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1535 (2009).
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this model for funding retirement is fraught with the risk that in their
later years many IRA owners may not be up to the task of successfully
managing their retirement nest egg.
V. MANAGING AN IRA WITH DIMINISHED MENTAL CAPACITY

Millions of individuals suffer from dementia, most of it likely progressive
Alzheimer's disease.' Other elderly have loss of mental capacity from
72
mental illness with clinical depression being the most prevalent form.
Some have temporary loss of mental capacity from delirium or from
reactions to prescription drugs.7 Finally, a few are terminally ill and
either the illness or the treatment for the alleviation of pain significantly
impairs their mental capacity.
The prevalence of dementia and other related ailments among the
elderly suggests a significant incidence of the loss of mental capacity
among retirees with IRAs. That raises the question of why we as a society
have constructed a retirement finance system-40 1(k) accounts and
rollover IRAs-that assumes the ability of retirees to manage those
accounts, when we know that inevitably many will be unable to do so
because of the loss of mental capacity. We ask individuals to manage their
retirement funds as they enter their 80s and 90s even though statistics
tell us that many people age 85 or older suffer from a loss of mental
capacity and many others experience significant physical decline.
Millions of individuals suffer from dementia; the Alzheimer's Association
reports that over 5 million Americans suffer from Alzheimer's dementia.7
Among those ages 75 to 79, approximately 6% have dementia.7 For those
ages 80 to 84, roughly 12% have dementia. 7 6 Dementia also affects over

71. JOHN C. CAVANAUGH & FREDDA BLANCHARD-FIELDS, ADULT DEVELOPMENT
AND AGING 123, 125 (4th ed. 2002).
72. Id. at 116.

73.

Id. at 123.
74. Alzheimer's Association, What is Alzheimer's, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_
disease -what -is -alzheimers.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
75. A. Scott Henderson & Anthony F. Jorm, Definition and Epidemiology of
Dementia: A Review, in 3 DEMENTIA 1, 11 tbl.l1.2 (Mario Maj & Normian Sartorius eds.,
2000).
7 6. Id
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20% of those ages 85 to 897 The percentages rise with age-over 30%
of those ages 90 to 94 have dementia. 78 A mental disease, dementia is
defined as declines in memory, thinking, and planning to the extent that
it makes independent living impossible .7 9 Even at the early stages,
dementia erodes the executive functioning that is the source of financial
acumen. 80 Inattentiveness to finances, such as not paying bills or
81
depositing dividend checks, is often an earlier indicator of dementia.
As memory and judgment decline, an individual is likely to make
investment mistakes either by action or inaction. If older individuals
suffering from dementia cannot remember to pay an electricity bill, then
how are they to manage an IRA account?
Unfortunately, by the time the family or spouse understands that the
individual has dementia and takes appropriate action, an older individual
with reduced mental capacity may have already made ill-advised
financial decisions. Individuals with impaired mental capacities are
susceptible to bad advice from friends and acquaintances, can be
persuaded to change their financial advisers, may respond to Internet
frauds and scams, and are susceptible to the advice of television "financial
experts.",8 2 Though past age 80, some buy ten-year deferred annuitiesthe monthly payment does not begin for ten years-that have punishing
early withdrawal penalties. 83 Others may lock their funds into bank
certificates of deposit (CDs) that pay low interest and have high

77. Id.
78. Id
79. Id at 2.
80. See CAVANAUGH & BLANCHARD-FIELDS, supra note 71, at 125-26.
81. See id
82. See Matthew A. Christiansen, Unconscionable: FinancialExploitation of Elderly
Persons with Dementia, 9 MARtQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 383 (2008) (describing the financial
exploitation of an 86-year-old woman with dementia and suggesting steps to avoid this
abuse).
83. For a discussion of abuses in annuity sales to elders and a description
of regulations governing those sales, see Joseph H. Aughtman, The Annuity Conundrum:
Responding to the Abuse of Elderly Investors, BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 38; Sally Balch
Hurme, Who's in the Batter'~s Box?: Regulating and Litigating Unsuitable Sales of
Variable Annuities, 1 PHOENIX L. REv. 365 (2008); see also Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust Registration
Requirement, I11U. PA. J. Bus. L. 749, 785 (2009).
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withdrawal penalties or may purchase exotic investments that return
only losses.8
While undergoing a decline in investment acumen because of
dementia, an IRA owner still faces the difficult annual, mandatory
distribution decisions-how much to withdraw beyond the minimum
and what assets to sell or distribute. If the minimum distribution is not
sufficient for living expenses, other savings must be spent, but which
ones? And how much capital can be spent without risking outliving
one's capital? These are difficult questions for anyone but are almost
impossible for an individual with declining mental capacity.
The caregivers of those with dementia, often the spouses, may be so
distracted by their caregiving obligations that they may not be able to
deal effectively with their own financial affairs. Some may experience
mental decline when they are overwhelmed by the demands of caring for
another. For many elderly, the death of a spouse or life partner causes
severe emotional wounds that can have profound ramifications. In the
days and months before the death of a spouse, the survivor may be
deeply engaged in caregiving for the dying spouse. The physical and
emotional demands of a dying spouse can be so demanding that they
may distract the healthy spouse from other obligations, such as
monitoring investments. An owner of an IRA may find it difficult to
focus on asset allocation while simultaneously being asked to respond to
questions about end-of-life health care for a dying spouse.
Asking very old individuals who are stressed by personal health
problems, by spousal health issues, or by the death of a close friend or
loved one, to manage successfuilly an IRA is asking a great deal; in some
instances, too much. For some, the problem is compounded if the dying
spouse was the primary financial planner. Imagine an 88-year-old
woman, Edith, whose 90-year-old husband, Eric, is dying from cancer.
Edith and Eric, like many of their age cohort, divided up the household
responsibilities, with Edith paying the bills and Eric managing his IRA.
He read the Wall Street Journal, watched cable news financial shows,
84. See Peter V. Rabins, Issues Raised by Research Using Persons Suffering from
Dementia Who Have Impaired Decisional Capacity, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 22,
25 (1998) (discussing the characteristics of dementia and how it can result in impaired
decisional capacity).
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and enjoyed talking to his broker. Edith was certainly capable of being
involved in investment decisions, but she knew how much Eric enjoyed
doing it and so stayed out of his way. Now Eric is very ill and no longer
capable of making those decisions. Their broker calls and suggests that
they sell some stocks and buy bonds. Edith, who has never paid much
attention to how the IRA was invested, must make a decision at a time
when she is worried and distracted by her husband's health. It is not a
good time for her to try to come up to speed on how to invest an IRA.
As a result of the need to take over the investment and management of
an IRA, surviving spouses often seek out advice and support. They
consult with adult children, siblings, nieces and nephews, and other
family members whom they trust, whether or not that trust is well
placed. It is simply in our nature to turn to family members for advice.
Investing is not for amateurs. Unfortunately, those whom an older person
may ask for advice too often lack the ability or knowledge to provide
good advice. Beyond mere ignorance is the possibility that the adviser
will succumb to greed, fraud, and conflicts of interest. Advice from
relatives can be colored by an expectation of inheritance. Some will take
advantage of or even defraud the IRA owner .8 5 A few who are asked for
assistance may have a conflict of interest, such as an adult son who
advises his widowed mother to invest the IRA in a mutual fund managed
by his wife. Or a daughter who insists that her son, the grandson of the
IRA owner, is a crackerjack investment adviser and so urges her father
to rely on his advice. In reality, the son has been fired from his last two
positions in investment firns for giving poor advice. In short, family
advisers and counselors may be very wise and helpful or they can be
ignorant, impulsive, foolish, fraudulent, and conflicted.8

85. Financial abuse of the elderly has been much written about by authors and
judges. For a recent example that cites a number of articles and cases, see Jane A. Black,
Note, The Not-So-Golden Years: Power of Attorney, Elder Abuse, and Why Our Laws
Are Failing a Vulnerable Population, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 289 (2008). Ingrid M.
Evans & David L. Cheng, Protecting Seniorsfrom FinancialAbuse, TRIAL, July 2009, at
54, 57 n.4, cites a source claiming that 90% of financial abuse of the elderly is perpetrated by
family members. For a general discussion of the financial abuse of the elderly, see Shelby
A.D. Moore & Jeanette Schaefer, Remembering the Forgotten Ones: Protecting the
Elderlyfrom FinancialAbuse, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 505, 516-21 (2004).
86. E.g., Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 887 P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming a
jury verdict in favor of an elderly mother who brought a fraud action alleging that her son and
daughter-in-law purchased her house for far less than the lowest appraised value).
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Reliance on professional advisers is not necessarily a better choice.
They vary greatly in quality; some are knowledgeable, others are not.
Some lack ethics and chum funds, advise the purchase of investments
that they know little about, engage in self-dealing, and sell dubious
products; some even commit outright fraud and financial exploitation.8
Beyond family and professional advisers, there is the wasteland of
advice in magazines, on the web, on television, at investment seminarsoften along with a "free" lunch-and in the form of tips from friends,
golf partners, and casual acquaintances. The world is full of those offering
advice without any particular knowledge. Others willing to "assist" an
older owner of an IRA range from the ignorant, to the conflicted, to the
outright crooked.8
Of course, some [RA owners receive good advice and profit from it,
but as those owners age, so do their advisers. The broker who assisted
the IRA owner for so many years retires and is replaced by the "new
associate," lacking in both knowledge and experience. The bank
manager who provided such good counsel dies and is replaced by an
eager young banker who is more interested in pedaling investment
products sold by the bank than protecting the aging client's capital.8 As
retirees age, many get out less and spend more time online at their
computers where they find advice, for example, that tells them to buy
gold and platinum. So they start trading in commodities. Their e-mail
often contains pleas from strange men in Nigeria who suggest novel
ways of making them both rich. Many elderly are suspicious, but others
succumb and send a check drawn on their IRA because the rates on bank
CDs are so low that it seems that partnering with a Nigerian general
might just be a smart move. In short, retirees are vulnerable and at risk

87. See Errold F. Moody, Jr., Elder Investments: A Critique of Professional and
Consumer Mediocrity, 10 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 13 5 (2008).
88. Johnny Parker, Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent's Financial
Abuse of an Elderly Client, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 683.
89. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 permitted commercial banks to
engage in formerly prohibited investment activity. James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards
Revisited: The Corruption of a FinancialHolding Company by a Corporate Client's
inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 7, 13-14 (2004). As a result, banks now offer investment
products in which that they urge their customers to invest. See id
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for financial fraud or risky speculations when it comes to their

investments.

90

Many IRA holders are likely much more financially conservative and
stay with what they know by simply rolling over their 40 1(k) account
into an IRA that they place in custody of the same financial institution
that handled their 40 1(k) account. Some do so because they receive a
letter, about the time that they are retiring, from the 401(k) account
holder informing them that they have the right to a tax-free rollover into
an IRA for which the financial institution would be happy to act as
custodian. What the retiring employees do not know is that the letter
9
informing them of the rollover opportunity is required by federal law. '
An employer can make the notification or can delegate it to a third party,
such as a financial entity that also acts as a repository for IRAs. The
notification right is often bestowed upon the financial institution that
held the 401(k) accounts. Financial institutions that act as custodians for
4011(k) accounts do so to collect the fees that can be obtained from acting
as a custodian. They also seek that status, however, because they hope

to continue to act as the custodian of the retirees' rollover

IRAS. 92

That notification right is valuable because a rollover IRA can be
expected to last the life of the retiree, which on average will be 15 to 25
years. Many IRAs continue much longer, however. A popular estate
planning technique is the "stretch IRA" that lasts until the death of the
93
last grandchild, which can extend the IRA for another 60 or 70 years.
With the prospect of acting as a custodian of an account for 90 or 100
years, it is easy to understand why financial institutions desire to be
selected to act as custodians of rollover IRAs.' Unfortunately the desire
to act may not be matched by the competence to give wise investment
advice.

90. Eric L. Carlson, Phishingfor Elderly Victims: As the Elderly Migrate to the
Internet FraudulentSchemes Targeting Them Follow, 14 ELDER L.J. 423, 424 (2006).
91. See I.R.C. § 402(f) (2006).
92. An example of a notification of the right to roll over a 401(k) account can be
seen at Fidelity Investments, Welcome to 401 k.com, https://40 1k.fidelity.comlstatic/dcl/
sharedldocuments/MKTGSpec ial-Tax Notice .pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
93. The stretch IRA is promoted in books aimed at IRA owners. See, e.g., JAMES
LANGE, RETiRE SEcuRE! (2d ed. 2009); see also ED SLo~r, PARLAY YOUR IRA INTO A
FAMILY FORTuNE (rev. ed. 2008).
94. In an attempt to obtain fees associated with IRAs, banks and financial
institutions aggressively advertise their willingness and expertise in managing them.
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VI. "SOLUTIONS" THAT SOLVE NOTHING
A retiree, who is confused about how to best invest a rollover IRA, is
likely to be advised to consult a financial adviser. But where does that
lead? Because of the many available choices, it can be daunting for an
older individual to select a trustworthy, knowledgeable, and wise and
prudent adviser. Consider the descriptive adjectives in the previous
sentence: trustworthy, knowledgeable, and wise and prudent. These
terms are not susceptible to quantitative measurement. Begin with
trustworthy. Surely it means at a minimum that the financial adviser
will not steal from the client, but how much more does it imply? It at
least implies that the adviser will not be guilty of practices that violate
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which governs those who provide
money management." Among other misdeeds, the Act prohibits advisers
from taking for their own benefit investment opportunities that should be
offered to clients, failing to achieve best execution in purchasing or
selling securities for the client, and inappropriately allocating securities
transactions among clients . 6
Does a trustworthy adviser sell a product for which the adviser
receives a commission? Some advisers sell only their advice. Others
recommend products, such as mutual finds, that they sell. Their advice
may be well grounded, but still the conflict of interest is disturbing.
Imagine, for example, a stockbroker, Fiona, who advises an older client
looking for more income to purchase the Beta Mutual Fund. What Fiona
says is true, but it is also true that she will earn a commission on that
purchase. The law requires her to disclose the conflict, 97 but what is the
client to do with that information? Is Fiona's advice less trustworthy
because of that potential commission? Indeed she has a conflict of
interest, but is it harmful to the client only if it corrupts the advice she
gives? If Fiona would recommend the Beta Mutual Fund even if she did
not earn a commission when the client bought it, the conflict is harmless.
Yet we will never know if the prospect of a commission influenced

95.

15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006).

96. Bany P. Barbash & Jai Massari, Thze Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Regulation
by Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 631 (2008).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, 80b-7.
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Fiona's advice. Perhaps even she was not aware of its subtle but real
influence on her analysis and the advice she gave to her elderly client.
If Gerald, a financial adviser, tells his client to buy mutual funds from
Phi Funds because Phi Funds pays him a finder's fee for every client
steered its way, we would say that Gerald is not trustworthy. Now
suppose Gerald tells the client that he might want to invest in The Gerald
Fund, a new mutual fund that Gerald opened last month. The fund has
no history, being brand new, but Gerald correctly tells the client that The
Gerald Fund will "seek out stocks of midsized corporations that appear
undervalued in light of the long-term prospects of the company." Of
course, Gerald is the one who decides what is an undervalued corporation.
Unfortunately, he is a one-man show and his "research" consists of
spending a lot of time on the Internet reading the advice of others.
Gerald sincerely believes that he can pick winners, and the fee for his
fund is on the low side. Is he trustworthy despite his possibly misplaced
confidence in his abilities?
The older investor may eschew the hometown "Geralds" as investment
advisers and instead seek out a more sophisticated investment opportunity,
such as a hedge fund. 98 Unfortunately for the investor, hedge funds are
replete with conflicts of interest, beginning with a performance fee that
creates incentives for the managers to make risky investments. The
greater the performnance the higher the fee, but if the fund sustains losses,
then the manager is still paid a fee based on a percentage of the assets
under management. 9 9 Because the gains and losses are not identical for
the investor and the manager, an investor faces the classic agency
problem that the agent will act in a manner that promotes the interests of
the agent rather than those of the principal)' 00 Other conflicts that arise
in the hedge fund world include the hedge fund manager's overseeing of

98. The term hedge fund has no precise definition, but it is generally used "to refer
to an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are
not sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment
company under the Investment Company Act." U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003), available at http://sec.gov/
news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
99. Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: ProtectingInvestors from Hedge Fund
Managers' Conflicts of Interest, 77 FoRDHAm L. REv. 3251, 3265 (2009).
100. Agency costs have received extensive scholarly attention. See, e.g., Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firn: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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multiple funds and the desire of the hedge fund to favor its prime broker
at the expense of its investors.' 01
Beyond conflicts of interest is the potential for outright fraud and
exploitation. Unfortunately there is simply no reliable test of who is
trustworthy. Most older investors probably equate an honest face, a
sincere manner, and most importantly, advice that seems to lead to
success as the sine qua non of trustworthiness. In short, an older
investor has no good way to know whom to trust and whom to suspect.
The sad tale of those who trusted the investment adviser Bernie Madoff
is only one example of a fraudulent financial adviser who had the
02
complete trust of his defrauded clients.1
As for determining whether a financial adviser is knowledgeable,
absent giving a financial adviser a written test, the older investor has to
rely on word of mouth-not a wise method--or something more
objective such as the license held by the adviser. In most professions,
one basic license identifies at least a modicum of capability. A lawyer
must have a J.D. and pass the state bar, and a physician will have an
M.D. and may be board certified. With financial advisers it is not so
simple. There are many licenses and a variety of letters that financial
advisers can put behind their names, but what those licenses and letters
mean is usually not known to a prospective older client looking for
postretirement assistance with an IRA.
An IRA owner will likely first come in contact with a broker, most
likely registered with the New York Stock Exchange. To be a general
securities registered representative, as most stockbrokers are, requires
passing an examination, usually the "Series 7," designed to test knowledge
regarding federal securities law, securities products, how markets
operate, basic economic and portfolio theory, taxes on investments, and

101. Sklar, supra note 99, at 3262.
102. Id. at 3253-55. Madoff defrauded his clients out of millions of dollars. Id
While pretending to invest their fuinds in stable, high-yield investments, he was essentially
operating a Ponzi scheme; he paid the earlier investors with the funds from the later
investors. Id
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what constitutes fair sales practices.' 0 3 Though it is a six-hour examination,
the material tested covers less than one college finance course does.' 0
Even so, brokers who pass the examination are permitted to offer
05
investment advice to their clients.'
The most common financial adviser designation is the Certified
Financial Planner (CFP) bestowed by the Certified Financial Planner
Board of Standards, Inc., a private entity. To qualify, the applicant must
take seven courses in various aspects of financial planning that are about
the equivalent of a semester of college study.10 6 As of March 1, 2007,
new licensees were required to pass a ten-hour examination and hold a
college degree in any course of study. 0 7 Licensees also had to have
three years of experience before they could provide financial advice to
customers. 1 8A proprietary, copyrighted term, the CFP seems to declare
that the holder knows a great deal about investment, but it is not clear
whether that is the case. Absent a neutral third party's overseeing of the
certification, there is no objective determination that passing the
examination demonstrates competency to be a financial adviser.
Higher up the ladder of expertise is a Chartered Financial Analyst
(CFA). Membership is limited to those sponsored by current members
and who meet educational and experience requirements: a Bachelor's
degree and at least four years of acceptable work experience in the
"investment decision-making process."'
Eventually the applicant must
pass three levels of examinations based on materials supplied by the
CFA Institute. Samples of the test questions are available online and
seem to indicate that a CFA will be reasonably conversant about
investing. Because advising most retirees with IR.As created by 401(k)
rollovers should not require a great deal of expertise, anyone with a CFA

103. Craig A. Cunningham, Note, Mind the Gap: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Stockbroker Overtime Eligibility Under the FairLabor Standards Act, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1243, 1254.
104. Moody, Jr., supra note 87, at 138.
105. Cunningham, supra note 103, at 1254.
106. Moody, Jr., supra note 87, at 142-43.
107. Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., Steps to Initial CFPO
Certification, http://www.cfp.net/become/Steps.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
108. Id.
109. CFA Institute, Membership Types and Requirements, http://www.cfainstitute.org/
cfaprog/charterholder/membership/membertypes.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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certification is likely to be able to give knowledgeable advice."' Yet
knowledgeable advice is not the same as good advice, that is, advice that
leads to successful investments.
Many knowledgeable investment
advisers have given heartfelt advice that proved to be unwise. Retirees
who seek professional investment advice have no certainty that they will
even "beat the market" over the 20 or 30 years that their IRAs must
last. '1
Rather than depending on individualized financial advice, an IRA
owner can follow the lead of funds designed for retirement investment
portfolios. If the IRA's balance is less than $300,000, an amount that
would encompass the great majority of these IRAs,'" 2 the investment
plan is rather simple, as illustrated by targeted mutual funds that
determine the mix of fixed-income securities and equities by the age of
the investor. At the age of the individual's retirement, for example, the
Fidelity Freedom 2010 Fund is invested about 50% in equities, 40% in
bonds, and 10% in cash or cash equivalents.' 13 For those age 85 or
older, Fidelity recommends a portfolio of 20% in equities, 35% in
bonds, 40% in short-term funds, and 5% in cash." 4 The Vanguard

110. Other titles are available, but the same point applies. There is no objective indicia
that acquiring a designation as a financial planner translates into being a knowledgeable,
wise adviser.
I11. PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIvE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY
To ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 3 (2007) (observing that "no investor, no matter how
skilled, can consistently 'beat the market' in picking individual securities").
112. See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 & fig. 12. It was estimated that in 2008
the average 401(k) or IRA balance of the household heads who were approaching
retirement was $56,000. 1d This is down from $78,000 in 2007 due to the severe decline in
the stock market. Id If these amounts represent anywhere close to the total retirement
savings of current retirees, their economic futures are bleak indeed. Assuming a 6% rate
of return postretirement, one author has declared that anyone facing 30 years of retirement
who wants an annual income of $50,000 per year should have $866,000 of retirement
funds at the time of retirement. TAmARA ERICKSON, RETIRE RETIREmENT 83 fig.3-5 (2008).
For an income of only $25,000, they still need $344,000 at the time of retirement. Id.
113. Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Freedom 2010 Fund, http://personal.fidelity.com/
products./funds/rnf1_fiame.shtnl?31617R506 ("Composition" tab) (last visited Apr. 18, 20 10).
114. See id.
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Target Retirement Income Fund, designed for those age 66 and older, is
invested 65% in bonds, 30% in stocks, and 5% in short-term reserves.' 15
Based on those allocations, an older IRA owner should:
(1) Allocate the fund between fixed-income assets-primarily
bonds-and equities. The percentage should be 50% to
60% in bonds and 40% to 50% in equities with a gradual
shift to a higher percentage of bonds as the owner ages. By
age 80, equities would be down to 20% to 30% of the total.
The IRA owner should buy and sell equities as necessary to
maintain the target allocation.
(2) For equities, buy mutual funds, particularly indexed funds.
Diversify investments across large, middle, and small
capitalized funds and invest 15% of the portfolio in mutual
funds holding international equities. Avoid drift in allocation
by selling when a mutual fund exceeds its percentage
allocation and buy funds that are below their allocation.
(3) Either buy bond funds or "ladder" bond purchases by
6
purchasing bonds that mature at regular fixed intervals."
For IRAs of greater value, the same rules could apply, but more
sophisticated or individualized planning techniques might be in order.
For the IRA owner, the problem is the surfeit of encouragement or
advice to move away from the "vanilla" form of investing described
above. Put simply, there are many more bad ways to invest than there
are sound ways. For example, the wrong adviser can urge a client to
overinvest in one sector of the market, to buy individual stocks rather
than mutual funds, to try to "beat" the market by excessive trading, or to
purchase individual bonds that pay higher interest but come with greater
risk.
Although older investors should have enough sense to avoid such
pitfalls, the reality is that when urged to do so by a credentialed financial
adviser, many older investors will follow the advice to their later regret.
115. Vanguard, Vanguard Target Retirement Income Fund, https://personal.vanguar(Lcom/
uslfilndslsnapshot?Fundld=0308&FundlntExt-lINT ("Portfolio & Management" tab) (last
visited Apr. 19, 20 10).
116. A retiree looking for investment advice would find similar recommendations in
popular literature such as SuzE O~tmAN, SumE ORmAN's 2009 AcTnoN PLAN (2008); RAMrT
SETHI, I WILL TEACH You To BE RICH, 172-74 (2009); PETER J. TANous, BUILDING A
WINNING PORTFOLIO (2008).
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Consequently, even retirees with sufficient mental capacity may misinvest
an IRA and put their retirement funds at risk. For those with diminished
mental capacity, the likelihood of investing their IRA in a way that
diminishes their retirement income is almost certain to occur. Even with
good investment advice, mentally incapacitated IRA owners cannot and
should not go it alone. They need help.
VII. THE LIMVITATIONS OF POWERS OF ATTORNEY AND

GUARDIANSHIP

The loss of ability of older individuals to handle financial affairs due
to mental incapacity or physical decline is nothing new; the need for an
alternative decisionmaker for incapacitated adults has long confronted
society. 117 The original legal response was guardianship' 18 with the durable
power of attorney as the more recent solution.' 19 Both, however, have
serious drawbacks.
Guardianship is a judicial determination that an individual is legally
incapacitated as defined by the applicable state statute.120 Every state
has a guardianship statute, and although they vary in detail, the typical
12 1
test of legal incapacity is an inability to make reasonable decisions.
Courts are empowered to appoint a guardian to act as a substitute
22
decisionmaker for the incapacitated individual.1
Because guardianship is a judicial proceeding it can be time-consuming,
expensive, and potentially a public affair. 123 If an older person lacks

117. Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship:An Analysis, a Critiqueanda Proposal
for Reform, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 599, 600-02 (198 1).
118. Some states use the term conservatorship when referring to judicially appointed
substitute decisionmakers for asset and financial management. Patricia C. McManus, A
TherapeuticJurisprudentialApproach to Guardianshipof Persons with Mild Cognitive
Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 591, 600 (2006). The description here of guardians
and guardianship also describes conservators and conservatorships.
119. The first durable power of attorney was created in 1954 by Virginia. 1954 Va.
Acts ch.486 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 11 -9.1 (2008)).
120. McManus, supra note 118, at 599-600.
121. E.g., UNtF. PROBATE CODE § 5-102(4), 8 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 414 (Supp. 2009).
122. See generally Frolik supra note 11 7 (analyzing guardianship powers and models
and evaluating statutory reform proposals).
123. See Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation To Resolve Probate
Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 423-31
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mental capacity, someone has to notice and care enough to petition the
court to find the individual incapacitated and appoint a guardian.
Typically the spouse or the children of the individual will petition; if not,
then friends, neighbors, medical providers, and even financial advisers
may petition. Some elderly are so isolated that their conditions are not
brought to the attention of the court. Those with IRAs or other assets,
however, almost surely will be known by someone willing to petition for
a guardianship. Money attracts attention.
Assuming a petition is filed and assuming that a responsible party is
willing to act as guardian, the proceedings take time because of notice
requirements and the need to set hearing dates.12 4 If an emergency
exists, such as potential fraud or financial exploitation, a temporary
guardian can often be appointed in quick order, but in most instances the
loss of mental capacity that requires a guardian of the estate does not rise
to an emergency as defined in the state's guardianship statute. 15During
the time needed to process a nonemnergency guardianship petition, the
alleged incapacitated person continues to control the IRA with possibly
unfortunate consequences from ill-considered investments or withdrawals.
If the alleged incapacitated person will not act, potentially valuable
investment opportunities may slip away during the period that the
guardianship is being sought. Guardianship is also costly. The lawyer
for the petitioner must be paid; an expert witness, usually a physician,
must be deposed or testifyi; there may be court costs; and depending on
state law, there may be a lawyer for the alleged incapacitated person
who will be paid from that person's assets. Absent a court order to the
contrary, the hearing on the guardianship petition will be open to the
public and could cause embarrassment to the alleged incapacitated
person. 16Ocaponted,
the guardian may be required to make regular

(1997) (comparing the legal issues that arise in guardianship proceedings to those that
arise in probate and discussing the advantages of undergoing mediation in these contexts).
124. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-30 1, -303 to -309, 8 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 142-53
(Supp. 2009).
125. For example, Pennsylvania permits the appointment of an emergency guardian
only if there is clear and convincing evidence of possible "irreparable harm to the person
or estate of the alleged incapacitated person." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5513 (West
2005).
126. Lawrence A. Frolik, GuardianshipReform: When the Best Is the Enemy of the
Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 347, 348 (1998).
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reports to the court.'127 The filing of the reports and other expenses
incurred by the guardian will also be charged to the funds of the
incapacitated person.
Though in theory guardianship would seem to solve the problem of
the incapacitated IRA owner, in reality it does not. The imposition of a
guardianship may not be possible, however, because although an
individual has a lowered level of capacity the appointment of a guardian
can only occur if the individual meets the state's statutory test of incapacity.
The statutes vary, but in essence they require that the individual be
unable to take care of his or her affairs to an extent that the individual's
health and finances are at risk.'128 Courts are supposed to focus on what
functions the individual can undertake rather than on the cause of the
mental disability.12 9 A mere decline in the IRA owner's mental acuity or
judgment would not justify the appointment of a guardian even if the
result was diminished investment success. The management of an IRA
requires the capacity to enter into a contract and that is defined as
"4whether the person in question possesses sufficient mind to understand,
in a reasonable manner, the nature, extent, character, and effect of the
act."'130 By the time the individual has lost enough capacity to justify a
guardianship, the individual may have already done significant harm to

127. Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, GuardianshipMonitoring: A National Survey
of Court Practices,37 STETSON L. REv. 143. 148-49 (2007).
128. For example, Pennsylvania defines "incapacitated person" as "an adult whose
ability to receive and evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions in any
way is impaired to such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his
financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health and safety."
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5501 (West 2005). The Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act of 1997 defines incapacitated person as an individual who "is unable to
receive and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions to such an extent
that the individual lacks the ability to meet essential requirements for physical health, safety,
or self-care, even with appropriate technological assistance." § 102(5), 8A U.L.A. 31213 (2003).
129. UNtF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102 cmt., 8A U.L.A.
314 (2003).
130. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 143 (1999); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2980
(McKinney 2007). For a discussion about contract capacity, see Lawrence A. Frolik &
Mary F. Radford, "Sufficient" Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity Requirements for
Different Documents, 2 NAT'L ACAD. ELDER L. AT7'YS J. 303, 315 (2006).
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the value of the IRA. This is because it would be the poor investment
decisions and the resulting losses in the IRA that would support a
31
finding of mental incapacity and the appointment of a guardian.'
Even if the court finds the requisite incapacity and approves a
guardianship, the individual appointed as guardian may lack the
knowledge to be an effective manager of an IRA. Typically, the court
appoints as guardian whomever the guardianship petition suggests. That
individual's ability to manage wisely a retirement IRA will vary greatly.
Often those nominated as proposed guardians are selected for their
willingness and availability to act as guardians rather than because they
have any special financial acumen.132 Worse, the individuals who agree
to act as guardians may agree to do so from a desire to profit from the
assets of the older person rather than from a desire to use the IRA to
promote the interests of the incapacitated person.133 And although
guardians are ostensibly under the control of the appointing court, in
reality court supervision of guardians is minimal and largely ineffective. 13
In a word, guardianship may be a poor substitute for a mentally alert
IRA owner.
In part because of the costs, complexities, and delay of guardianship,
every state has a statute that authorizes the power of attorney. The
power of attorney permits an individual-the principal-to appoint an
agent to handle the principal's financial affairs in the event the principal
should be unable to do so.135 The authority granted to the agent is
131. In theory in states that permit limited guardianship-and almost all do-it
might be possible to have a limited guardian appointed to manage the IRA at the first sign of
diminished capacity. The claim would be that the individual had a specific, not global,
incapacity that justified the appointment of a guardian whose authority was limited to
overseeing the IRA. In reality, limited guardianships are seldom used, and a court might
be reluctant to impose a guardianship for such a narrow purpose. See Lawrence A. Frolik,
Promoting JudicialAcceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship,31 STETSON L. REv.
735, 753-55 (2002).
132. Daniel Leinung, Comment, Reforming New York State's GuardianshipSystem:
It's Time for a Change (Again), 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 677, 679 (2009).
133. Family members who typically serve as guardians, such as spouses or adult
children, may expect to inherit the IRA and so manage it more with an eye to their own
prospects than in the interest of the incapacitated owner. Alison Barnes, The Virtues of
Corporateand ProfessionalGuardians,31 STETSON L. REv. 941, 956 (2002).
134. Karp & Wood, supra note 127, at 185.
135. The statutes vary from state to state, but are similar in most respects to the
Uniform Power of Attorney Act. 8B U.L.A. 29 (Supp. 2009). The power of attorney is
durable, meaning that it does not terminate in the event that the principal loses capacity.
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governed by the terms of the power of attorney document, but the usual
practice is to grant the agent powers that are coterminous with those of
the principal. Although a few powers of attorney do not take effect until
the principal is incapacitated-known as "springing durable powers of
attorney" 13 6 -most take effect upon the execution of the power by the
principal and, if necessary under state law, when witnessed, notarized, or
137
attested to by the agent.
The use of power of attorney seems to be the sensible and efficient
solution to an older retiree losing the ability to handle a retirement IRA.
It is inexpensive because most powers of attorney are based on a form or
a standard document created by the attorney and both the existence and
the contents of the power of attorney are private. The durable power of
attorney is akin to a private guardianship arrangement with the agent
granted powers comparable to those of a guardian. However, no court
involvement or supervision is necessary. Even the reluctance of third
parties to accept the agent's authority has been overcome or minimized
in many states because of statutes that penalize a third party who refuses
to accept the authority of an agent if the durable power of attorney is
valid on its face."' 8 Given the frequency of the execution of durable
powers of attorney and the number of incapacitated elderly, many IRAs
are likely being managed by agents.
Despite the popular use of the durable power of attorney, no state has
succeeded in preventing the misuse of the power by the agent. Absent
requirements in the power that mandate oversight or preapproval of
agents' actions, agents are essentially on their own. 13 9 Granted, agents
Id. § 104, 8B U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 2009). For a discussion of the relative merits of
guardianship and powers of attorney, see Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an
Alternative to Guardianship. Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REv. 7 (2007).
136. Springing powers of attorney have fallen into disfavor because of the attendant
uncertainty and cost in proving the incapacity of the principal. Lawrence A. Frolik,
Keep Powers of Attorney in Check, TRIAL, Apr. 2009, at 42, 42.
137. See Black, supra note 85, at 296 & n.54.
138. Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance
Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENix L. REv. 343, 352 (2008).
139. The lack of supervision and communication can easily lead to abusive use of the
power. See Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategyfor Curbing the Hidden
Abuses of DurablePowers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 18 (2006).
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may have to account for their actions, either formally or informally, but
until that day, assuming it ever comes, an agent does what the agent
thinks is best. Armed with fiduciary powers and responsibilities, the
agent manages and promotes the financial affairs of the principal as the
agent sees fit. Of course, that is the point of a power of attorney-to
create powers in the agent that are very similar to the rights of the
principal. Unfortunately, that wide grant of authority makes it easy for
an agent to misuse the principal's assets. In the past, agents have made
inappropriate gifts to third parties, made inappropriate gifts to themselves,
made gifts to charities not favored by the principals, defeated estate plans
by creating joint accounts with survivorship interests, changed
beneficiaries named in life insurance contracts, revoked trusts, engaged
in self-dealing, and used their powers to benefit their spouses, friends, or
relatives.140 In short, agents routinely violate their fiduciary obligations
and use their authorities to advance their own interests at the expense of
4
the principals.'1 '
An elderly IRA owner who appoints an agent with authority to manage
that IRA-and the principal's other assets-is taking a significant risk that
the agent will misuse the power and so dissipate the assets held by the
IRA. If the agent dissipates the assets, the elderly IRA owner will not
only be incapacitated but also broke. Of course, an elderly IRA owner
will try to select a trustworthy person to act as agent. Probably most
succeed in doing so. Spouses can almost always be trusted, children
often trusted, but after that, the odds increase that the agent will act in a
way that the principal would not approve of had the principal retained
capacity.
Agent incompetence is yet another risk created by a durable power of
attorney. Again, though the principal will try to name an agent capable
of managing finances, not all will be up to the task. If an 85-year-old
IRA owner names his 84-year-old wife his agent, will she be sharp
enough in the coming years to successfully manage his account? What
about the 90-year-old incapacitated woman who names her 67-year-old
daughter as agent? The daughter subsequently has a minor stroke that
impairs her executive functioning but continues to act as agent with

140. See Whitton, supra note 138, at 355-64.
141. See Frolik, supra note 136; Jennifer L. Rhiein, Note, No One in Charge: Durable
Powers of Attorney and the Failure To ProtectIncapacitatedPrincipals, 17 ELDER L.J.
165 (2009).
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predictably poor results. Finally, imagine an 80-year-old single woman
who names her nephew as her agent. She trusts him because he is a
church deacon. Her faith in his trustworthiness is well placed, but he
directs that her IRA be managed by a stockbroker, a member of his
congregation, who unfortunately is a compulsive gambler. The broker
chums the aunt's stock account in order to produce high commissions.
The result is a steady loss in capital for the aunt.
An elderly IRA owner can take steps to reduce the risk of agent
misuse of assets or incompetence by building safeguards into the power
of attorney. The principal can name a "monitor" to review the agent's
acts or the agent can be required to regularly report to a third party. For
example, if one child is selected to act as the agent because of living
near the principal, that child-agent could be required to report to the
other children the actions taken pursuant to the power of attorney.
Nothing keeps one honest like having to explain one's actions. If there
are no other children, perhaps the agent could report to the lawyer who
drafted the durable power of attorney. Regardless of to whom the agent
reports, the point is to have someone who monitors the acts of the agent.
The monitor should examine the investment decisions and spending of
the principal's assets by the agent to prevent losses either due to inept
investments or self-dealing, and to discourage unnecessary, ill-advised,
or fraudulent spending.
Although nominally a solution, the appointment of a monitor to oversee
the agent has several drawbacks. The initial problem is finding someone
qualified and willing to act as a monitor of an agent. Many older
persons find it difficult enough to identify someone to act as agent.
Absent a competent spouse, a child is often considered. But not all
children are up to the task. Some live too far away to be a practical
choice, others lack the judgment or intelligence to perform well, and
some are not trustworthy, perhaps because of financial problems or drug
Finding a second competent, trustworthy
or alcohol dependency.
individual in addition to the agent may prove difficult if not impossible.
Even if an appropriate person is available and willing to act as monitor,
there is no guarantee that the monitor will be capable of fulfilling that
function when the time comes to do so. The power of attorney may not
be needed for many years after it is signed. By then the monitor may no
longer have any interest in serving as a monitor, may have moved too far
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away to be effective, may have lost too much physical or mental capacity to
function successfully as a monitor, may have personal problems that
make it difficult to perform effectively, or may have died. Because of
these possibilities, the principal should name a successor monitor, but
naming a successor monitor brings up the same problem-who to
name-that arose in the selection of the initial monitor.
If a volunteer monitor is not available, the principal could name a
professional, such as an attorney. Doing so, however, could be expensive
and defeats one advantage of a power of attorney-its lack of cost.
Moreover, some individuals may not be willing to serve as agents if their
acts are to be overseen by a lawyer or other professional. And if a
professional is to be used, why not just use the professional as the agent
42
and thereby obviate the need for a monitor?1
An aging owner of a retirement IRA, who is losing the ability to
manage it, faces the alternative of either accepting guardianship or
appointing an agent under a durable power of attorney. This is the world
that our nation's retirement system has created for its elderly. The
reliance on 401(k) plans has been rightly criticized for leaving retirees
with inadequate savings for their retirement.14 3 Many have attacked
401(k) accounts for putting the investment risk on employees who
generally are not up to the burden.'"4 But even those few employees
who arrive at retirement having adequately managed their accounts and
who have accounts with enough money to create a financially secure
retirement must still navigate the perilous years of their retirement. Like
a modern Odysseus, they have long and difficult voyages to navigate.
We could ease that journey if we replace 401 (k) accounts with defined
benefit plans that create lifetime pensions. That is not going to happen;
the era of defined benefit plans is over.'14 5 Many commentators have
142. To be sure, a professional can misuse a power of attorney, but that seems less
likely. And if the professional does misuse the power, at least it is likely that there will
be malpractice insurance available to pay for the resulting damages.
143. PATRICK PURCELL & JOH-N J. TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40707,
40 1(K) PLANS AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2009), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 163 7&context=key_
workplace; Stabile, supra note 38, at 310-16.
144. Stabile, supra note 38, at 312; see also Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself
Retirement: Allowing Employees To Direct the Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 365 (2006) ("Numerous studies indicate that many participants
are not adequately prepared to manage the investment of their retirement accounts.").
145. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1; Stabile, supra note 38, at 307.
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made suggestions on how to deal with the weakness of 401(k) plans,
from modest proposals such as encouraging employees to invest in
mutual funds that adjust the asset allocation as the employee nears
retirement, to more drastic ideas such as making individual retirement
accounts mandatory.14 6 Although these proposals may create more and
better-funded 40 1(k) accounts, few of the proposals deal with the
problem of managing a postretirement, rollover IRA.
VIII. WHY ANNUITIES HAVE NOT BEEN THE SOLUTION
The realistic solution for postretirement management of a rollover
IRA is to recreate the advantages of the defined benefit pension by
converting some or all of the 401(k) account at retirement into an
immediate pay, lifetime annuity. This would address the two significant
risks created for retirees by 401(k) accounts, the financial investment
risk and the longevity risk. Although the monthly payout by the annuity
would depend upon the amount in the 401(k) account-the higher the
value of the account, the greater the monthly annuity payout-at least
the retiree would have the assurance of lifetime income and not be faced
with the difficulty of investing the 40 1(k) account proceeds. 147 In short,
a defined contribution plan can capture some of the advantages of a
defined benefit plan by converting the lump-sum value of the 401(k)
account into an annuity. It is not necessary to invest all of the IRA into
an immediate pay annuity. Merely investing half of the account can
dramatically increase the probability that the retiree will not outlive the
48
1R.
Unfortunately only 20% of defined contribution plans offer retirees
the option of converting their accounts into an annuity, and only about
10% of the employees of those plans choose the annuity option. 44' Even
146.

Stabile, supra note 3 8, at 3 17-2 1.
147. For the advantages of converting a 40 1(k) account into an immediate pay,
lifetime annuity, see PURCELL & ToPOLESKI, supra note 143, at 24-26.
148. Walter Updegrave, Make Your Dough Last and Last. . and Last, MONEY,
Oct. 2009, at 92, 94.
149. PURCELL & ToPOLESKi, supra note 143, at 25; Mark Bruno, Radical Retirement
Initiativefrom Brookings in the Works, INVESTmENT NEWS, May 3, 2009. If a 401 (k)
plan offers an alternative of an annuity instead of a lump-sum distribution, the selection by the
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if an annuity is available as part of the 401(k) plan, retirees typically
prefer a lump-sum distribution to an annuity. 50 Some undoubtedly buy
annuities, but they have to purchase them as individuals so they do not
get the better price offered to groups. Even the task of finding the best
"deal" while still buying the annuity from a financially sound company
may be too daunting a task for many. Perhaps they reject annuities
because they are not gamblers, for an annuity is in a sense a bet with the
annuity providers by the purchasers that they will outlive their actuarial
predicted life spans. For example, for a 65-year-old, the predicted life
expectancy is about 18 years.'15 ' The amount of the monthly payout is a
function of the cost of the annuity, the projected future rate of return for
the company selling the annuity, and the purchaser's life expectancy. A
purchaser of an annuity, who dies 18 years after the purchase of the
annuity, will have received payments that equal the cost of the annuity,
plus the projected investment return on that investment, minus the
transaction costs and profit for the seller of the annuity. Every year that
the purchaser outlives those projected 18 years will result in a bonus
payment to the purchaser. The purchaser has in a way won the bet with
the issuer of the annuity. A purchaser, however, who dies before the end
of the eighteenth year has "lost" the bet because the purchaser will have
paid more to the issuer than the issuer paid back.'15 2 Research indicates
that if the potential purchaser of an annuity thinks of it as an investment,
an annuity seems riskier than a bond because the total return on
53
the annuity depends on how long the annuitant lives.'
plan administrator of the annuity provider is a flduciary decision with the attendant possible
liability if the annuity provider defaults on its obligations. in late 2008, the Employee
Benefits Security Administration under the Department of Labor issued final regulations
designed to create a safe harbor to protect the plan administrator from liability based
upon its selection of the annuity provider. Selection of Annuity Providers-Safe Harbor
for Individual Account Plans, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,447, 58,447-50 (Oct. 7, 2008). The hope
was to encourage more 401(k) plans to offer an annuity option. Id
150. Steven D. Cohen, AutoenrollmentandAnnuiization: Enabling401(k) "DB-ation,"
5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 281, 317 (2009).
151. The life expectancy is slightly greater for a woman and somewhat less for a
man. See supra note 4 1.
152. Purchasers may get back the cost of the annuity, but if they die before their
actuarial life expectancy, they will not be paid back the time value of their investment in
the annuity.
153. Conversely, if the potential purchaser thinks in terms of consumption, the
higher rate of disposable income provided by an annuity-investment income plus return
of capital--compared to a safe investment such as a bond, makes the annuity very
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True, betting against an annuity issuer is not the point of buying an
annuity. Rather for the purchaser, an annuity is a contractual guarantee
of a set monthly income for life. Because an annuity is a way of
spending principal without the danger of living longer than the principal
lasts, the purchase of an annuity is more of a hedge than a bet. Living
beyond one's life expectancy is the bonus. The annuity ensures that the
good news of a long life is not accompanied by the bad news of running
out of money before death. Still, there is that business of dying before
getting back all the money that one paid for the annuity. The thought or
fear of buying an annuity and then dying soon after appears to chill the
sale of the product. The issuer's response is to sell annuities that pay
benefits for a guaranteed minimum number of years, such as ten years.
If the purchaser dies during that period, the payments continue for the
duration of the minimum payout period to a beneficiary designated by
the purchaser. The minimum payout period is designed to overcome the
fear in potential purchasers that they will buy an annuity and die a week
later, a bad bet indeed. Of course, a minimum payout period lowers the
monthly benefit, but that trade-off is either acceptable to purchasers of
annuities or not appreciated. Another way to address potential purchasers'
fear of their early deaths has been to sell a survivor or two-life annuity,
which provides that the annuity continues to pay out-perhaps a reduced
amount-to a spouse or other beneficiary after the death of the purchaser
of the annuity.
Yet another response to prospective purchasers' fear of premature
death has been the creation of new products designed to distribute the
assets in monthly increments and also return any undistributed capital.
Fidelity, the seller of mutual funds, has introduced a product known as
an "income replacement fund." The fuinds, based on the three-year average
asset value, distribute monthly distributions that ideally increase enough

JEFFREY R. BROWN ET AL., TIAA-CREF INST., TRENDS & IssuES: FRAMING
AND ANNumrEs 2 (2009), available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/pdf/research/trends_-

attractive.

issues/ti-framingannuities_0l09.pdf. The secret to successful marketing of annuities is
presenting the product as providing more consumption. Id. Known as the practice of
"framing," purchasers respond differently to a choice depending on how the outcome is
presented; in this case whether it is a choice between different investments or a choice
about how to capture the greatest possible consumption at the lowest risk. Id
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to at least keep pace with inflation. Unlike an annuity, the funds do not
guarantee a set monthly payment for life, but they are less costly and,
even more important, the individual can redeem the investment at any
time. An example of a projected payout, as advertised in March 2010, by
a Fidelity fund with an investment of $100,000, was $474 per month or
$5688 per year for 25 years. The payments were expected to rise and
keep pace with inflation. At the end of the 25 years, the account was
expected to be exhausted. 154 If the investor dies before the fund is
completely spent, the remainder of the account passes to those identified
as the account beneficiaries. Although the fuinds are attracting investors,
it is unclear whether they are attracting IRA funds. The projected
exhaustion of the funds prior to death may be a significant deterrence in
their sale to individuals looking for the assurance of lifetime income.
For many, annuities are unattractive because they limit the ability to
leave a financial legacy. To a remarkable degree, the elderly are willing
to forego consumption in order to preserve their assets so that they can
pass them on, usually to their children.' 55 Although the children and
their financial advisers may urge the older person to spend more money
and enjoy retirement, to "live a little," that advice is often not heeded.
Many elderly are determined to preserve their capital for their heirs. The
reason for that compelling desire to leave a legacy is not clear. Some
may feel a continuing obligation to take care of their children despite
those children being adults.'
Certainly some adult children have special
financial needs, perhaps because of a disability, a divorce, or drug or
alcohol dependency. Yet the desire for a legacy goes beyond obvious
financial needs of the heirs. For some elderly, leaving a legacy may be a
final attempt to have themselves remembered with affection and respect
by their heirs. For other elderly, leaving a legacy may be an attempt at
self-respect by making their lives appear to have value. They can say to

154. Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Income Replacement Funds, http://personal. fidelity.
coml/products/funds/contentl~atYouCanBuy/income replacement futnds-overview.shtml.
cvsr?immpid=l1&immid=0 109&imm-eid=e2770792&buf=999999 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2010).
155. Perhaps that desire is a reflection of the view that, "'I am what survives of
me."' ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 141 (1968).
156. A 70-year-old retiree is likely to have children who are age 40 to 50 and who
should be capable of caring for themselves by that age. Yet the moral and cultural norms
that underpin the desire to leave a legacy to children are very strong. See Sarah-Vaughan
Brakman, Do Parents Owe Their Children a Legacy?, GENERATIONS, Fall 1996, at 2 1.
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themselves, "Though I was not famous or financially successful, still I was
thrifty and sacrificed enough to be able to pass on wealth to my children."
Whatever the motivation, the desire to leave a legacy impedes the
purchase of an annuity because the potential buyer focuses on the157loss of
capital and the diminished legacy rather than the guaranteed income .
Financially sophisticated retirees who understand the advantages of
purchasing annuities may still be reluctant to buy them for several other
reasons. Some may fear the ability of the insurer to make good on the
contract to pay the annuity. The last few years have seen many financial
institutions in peril, which has likely frightened off some potential
purchasers who fear that the company selling the annuity may not be in
business for the 30 or more years that it may be obligated to make monthly
payments.
Some potential purchasers may be willing to bear the modest risk of
possible nonpayment but may still be reluctant to buy annuities because
of the fear of rising interest rates. The seller of the annuity relies on life
expectancy probability to ensure that enough purchasers of the annuity
will die soon enough to create a pool of funds sufficient to pay benefits
to those who live past their life expectancy. The benefits to the longlived are paid not just out of the funds paid by the short-lived, however,
but also by the investment income earned by the issuer on the funds paid
to it by the purchasers of the annuities. The greater the rate of investment
return earned on the purchase funds, the higher the monthly benefits that
58
can be paid to the annuitants. 1

157. Potential purchasers of annuities may not appreciate that they could buy an annuity
and save the monthly payments. By their actuarial age they would have saved back the
cost of the annuity plus some percentage return on their "investment," which in a way is
what an annuity is. Of course, they assume the risk of dying before they recapture the
annuity cost, but that risk is counterbalanced by the opportunity to live long enough to
save much more than they paid for the annuity.
158. For example, assume an annuity has a 30-year payout and costs $100,000. If
the investment rate of return over the life of the annuity is estimated at 4%, the monthly
benefit is about $472. If the investment rate of return is estimated at 6%, the monthly
benefit is $587-an almost 25% higher monthly benefit. See Dinkytown.net, Financial
Calculators, http://www.dinkytown.net/java/InvestmentDistribution2.htmnl (last visited Apr.
19, 2010).
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A fixed rate annuity represents a "bet" on future rates of investment
return by both the issuer of the annuity and the individual who buys it.
One reasonable fear of the annuity purchaser is that interest rates-as
well as investment returns in general-will rise after the annuity has
been purchased. Though the buyer of the annuity will not know the rate
of return anticipated by the issuer of the annuity, if interest rates are very
low, the projected rate of return for the issuer of the annuity will be
correspondingly low. That in turn will lower the amount of the monthly
59
benefit.1
Many retirees simply do not want to tie up or invest their capital in
long-term, irrevocable investments, such as annuities, particularly in
times of low interest rates or low yields on investments. Of course, what
is a "time of low interest rates" is never clear. What seems low today
may seem better tomorrow if rates decline even further. Even if rates are
not particularly low, however, the potential buyer of an annuity can
always imagine that after buying an annuity, in a few months or years
interest rates will rise. It is this fear of rising interest rates and higher
future investment returns that makes some reluctant to purchase an

annuity.16
IX. THE PUBLIC ANNUITY SOLUTION

Whatever the reason for the reluctance of retirees to buy annuities, the
reality is that it is unlikely to change. Yet the purchase of an annuity

159. If interest rates are high and the insurance company anticipates a relatively
robust investment return on the funds it acquires from the sale of annuities, the promised
monthly payout will be higher. In that case, it is the issuer of the annuity who is likely to
suffer as a result of the investment risk inherent in an annuity, for if the issuer does not
obtain those projected returns, it will find itself paying out more to annuitants than it is
realizing from its investments.
160. One approach to potential upward movements in interest rates is to purchase
smaller annuities every six months for three or four years. Incremental purchasing of
annuities smoothes out the variance in interest rates. For example, instead of paying
$300,000 for an annuity, the retiree would buy six annuities, each for $50,000, one every
six months. If interest rates rose during the three-year period, the purchaser would receive
greater monthly benefits from the later purchased annuities. Of course, deferred purchases
carry the risk that interest rates might decrease, meaning that the monthly benefits from
the later purchases would be lower. Another solution is the purchase of short-term annuities
that pay benefits for only three to five years. At the end of the term, the annuitant has
the option of purchasing another annuity and thus to take advantage of rising interest
rates and improving rates of return on investments.
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with at least part of the 40 1(k) account is a wise answer to investment
and longevity risks. To overcome the reluctance of retirees to purchase
annuities requires an annuity product that addresses their concers-risk
of payment, loss of an estate, fear of dying before receiving the value of
the annuity, and fear of rising interest rates after the purchase of the
annuity. The private sector is not going to create such a product. If it
could, it would have done so by now. In the absence of a private solution,
the government must create, sell, and likely subsidize new forms of
annuities that retirees will purchase.
The justification for a government-subsidized annuity is the public
interest in assisting retirees to use their 401 (k) savings to create lifetime,
assured streams of income. For years the nation has promoted employerprovided retirement plans. The federal income tax grants favored status
to employer-provided pensions by permitting both employers and
employees to take current deductions for contributions to such plans, and
by not taxing employees even on vested benefits until actual receipt of
the pension. 16' The cost of these tax advantages is significant. As pointed
out, "tax expenditures support the creation of private pensions at
considerable cost to the government in lost tax revenues."1'6 For 2009,
it was estimated that employer-provided retirement plans, including
401(k) plans, resulted in a loss of tax revenue of $125 billion.6 36 The
national concern that these tax deferrals actually result in improved
retirement benefits for employees was part of the reason for the enactment
1
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 64
and the creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
within the Department of Labor, which ensures that defined benefit

161. The tax deductibility of employer contributions is found in I.R.C. § 404(a) (2006).
Tax deferral for the employee arises from § 402(a). Id. § 402(a) (2006). The pension trust
itself is exempt from taxation. Id § 5011(a) (2006).
162. Lorraine A. Schmall with Nathan limes, Failure of Equity: Discriminatory
Plant Closing as an IrremediableInjury Under ERISA , 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 81, 87 (2005).
163. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., EsrltThs OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005-2009, at 38-39 tbl.1I (J. Comm. Print 2005).
164. 29 U.S.C. §§ 100 1-1461 (2006).
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pension benefits will be paid even if the employer can no longer afford
65
to fund the plan.'1

ERISA states that employee benefit plans are "affected with a national
public interest" that is served by strengthening the operation of the plans
and safeguarding their "financial soundness." 16 6 Protecting an employee's
retirement funds is so important that the employee is not allowed to

alienate or assign the

fuinds.' 6 7

Protection of employees' retirement plans

during their working years, however, is of little avail if the retirement
assets are at risk during the long years of retirement. Just as ERISA
protects retirement benefits during working years, and the PBGC
protects defined benefit plan benefits after retirement, what is required is
federal legislation that offers retirees with 401(k) plans a protected
stream of income during their retirement.16
How an annuity can create retirement security can be seen from the
following example.' 69 Assume a retiree at age 65 purchases an immediate
pay, single-life annuity at a cost of $200,000. The annual payout would
be $14,480, or $1206 per month.170 If the individual self-annuitized, that
is, left the money in the IRA and drew down $14,480 per year, assuming
the investment return on the IRA was the same as the projected
investment return on the annuity, the individual would exhaust the IRA

165. Id. § 1302(a).
166. Id. § 1001 (a).
167. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
168. One proposal is the "Universal 40 1(k) Plan" suggested by Michael Calabrese,
who advocates an automatic employment-based 401(k)-type account for every worker
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-642,
PRIVATE PENSIONS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES COULD ADDRESS RETIREMENT RISKS
FACED BY WORKERS BUT POSE TRADE-OFFS 42 (2009), available at http://www.gao.

who does not choose to opt out.

gov/new.items/d09642.pdf. Upon retirement, an individual's account balance would be
automnatically converted into an annuity purchased though the federal government at group
rates. Id at 43. Retirees would have the option to opt out of the annuity and take a lump-sum
distribution. Id. A proposal to supplement Social Security mandatory retirement savings
accounts also proposes benefit packages where "[p]resumably, a life annuity (and for couples,
perhaps a double life annuity) should be at least a major part of the package." SHAVIRO,
supra note 2, at 155.
169. This example is adapted from JEFFERY R. BROWN ET AL., TIAA-CREF INST.,
TRENDS & ISSUES: A PAYCHECK FOR LIFE: THE ROLE OF ANNUITES INYOUR RETIREMENT
PORTFOLIO 3-4 (2008), available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/pdf/researh/trends_
issues/TrendslssuesO 6O8B3rown -01 .pdf.
170. This assumes the annuity was purchased in January 2008 and the payout was
equal to that of a TIAA Traditional annuity. Id. at 3.
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around age 85. Of course, no retiree would continue to draw down an
IRA to zero. In reality the retiree would have to reduce the annual
distribution from the IRA as the retiree aged. More realistically, the
retiree could invest the IRA and, based on current investment rates of
return, calculate equal annual distributions that would last for 35 years or
until the retiree reached age 100 when the IRA would be exhausted.
However, this strategy would yield an annual income about 28% lower,
or $4136 less per year, than provided by an annuity whose benefit
calculations were based on the same projected investment return.17 1 And
of course there is still the risk of living past age 100 with no more
income from the IRA account. Any distribution scheme other than an
annuity will yield either lower income for life or higher income for a
period less than life.
By law, defined benefit pension plans must offer retirees a joint and
survivor annuity as the default form of benefit. 172 Upon retirement,
owners of 401(k) accounts should be permitted to convert tax-free part
or all of their 401(k) accounts into immediate pay annuities that would
recreate the advantages of defined benefit plans, including lifetime
income and freedom from making investment decisions during a time of
declining physical and mental capabilities. Like the joint survivor
annuities offered by defined benefit plans, the governmental annuity
would be a two-life annuity-terminate at the later to die of the husband
or wife-unless the spouse of the retiring employee agreed to permit the
employee to purchase a single-life annuity . 173 No one would be required
to purchase an annuity from the government, but if the annuity were
attractive enough, hopefully many retirees would invest all or part of
their 401(k) assets in annuities. To entice retirees to purchase a
government-backed annuity would require that the annuity be structured

171. Id at 4. However, if the investment return over the 35 years is greater than originally
anticipated, the retiree could take out more annual income. Conversely, if the rate of return was
less than anticipated, the retiree would have to reduce the annual income distributed from
the IRA.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006).
173. This is similar to the spousal waiver provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2). See
id. § 1055(c)(2).
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in a manner that meets the objections to private annuities, which
currently discourage their purchase by retirees.
A public entity that sold annuities fully backed by the federal government
would overcome retiree fears about the financial solvency of the issuer
of the annuity. 174 So that the government would not compete generally
with issuers of annuities, the entity, which might be named the Federal
Annuity and Insurance Corporation (FAIC), should be limited to selling
annuities to retirees who pay for them with fuinds from their 401(k) or a
rollover IRA.
As with any issuer of annuities, FAIC would sell annuities that were
actuarially sound-the cost of the annuity being sufficient to support the
projected monthly payout. FAIC should be able to sell a more attractively
priced annuity in part because it will realize some savings in the form of
lower administrative costs, the lack of the need to advertise, and savings
from not paying commissions to sellers of the annuities as well as not
11
being burdened with the need to create profit.
The FAIC annuity would be attractive not only because of the income
protection offered to purchasers, but also because it would offer
enhanced features, some of which might have to be subsidized for the
cost of the annuity to be competitive. The annuity sold by FAIC would
be backed by the federal government thereby alleviating any concern by
purchasers as to whether they will be paid all the monthly benefits
promised to them. To meet the concern of annuity purchasers that they
might be buying the annuity when interest rates are too low, FAIC could
offer annuities that are not tied to current interest rates but rather
calculate monthly benefits based on a fixed, minimum projected rate of
return, such as 5%. The FAIC annuity should pay a predictable monthly
benefit unlike private annuities, whose payouts vary at the time of sale
depending on interest rates and anticipated returns on the investment of
the purchase price. The use of a minimum benefit rate would permit
employees who are nearing retirement to calculate what they might
expect as a monthly annuity payment if they were to buy an FAIC
annuity. A fixed, minimum rate of return would also protect those who
174. The Retirement Security Project has suggested a federal guarantee program to
back annuities, much like the support that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
provides to bank deposits. Bruno, supra note 149.
175. For a discussion of the costs associated with the sale of private annuities, see
Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization,46 ARIz. L.
REv. 53, 86 (2004).
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retire during times of low interest rates and low expected rates of
investment return. An individual's retirement income should not be held
captive to the vagaries of projected investment return that prevail at the
time of retirement. The pensions paid to those who participate in defined
benefit plans are not dependent on how robust the economy is on the
date of their retirement. Similarly, employees who participate in 401(k)
plans should have the opportunity to convert their 401(k) accounts into
streams of income that do not vary widely with the economic
176
circumstances that happen to prevail at the time of their retirement.
To guarantee a minimum monthly payout might require in times of
low interest rates and low expected rates of return that the government
subsidize the annuity benefits. The subsidy would not have to be great.
For example, if the retiree paid $200,000 for an annuity that was
calculated to pay monthly benefits for 25 years, if the projected rate of
return is 5% then the monthly payment would be approximately $1170.
If the actual rate of return for the 25 years was only 3%, then the
monthly rate of return would have to be reduced to $950 per month,
meaning that to pay at a rate of 5% return would require a subsidy of
about $220 per month. 17 7 Of course, over a 25-year period interest rates
will vary, with some years having a yield in excess of 5% and some
years below so that it is unlikely that the subsidy would be necessary for
many months. Moreover, during periods when the projected investment
rate of return exceeded the minimum interest rate, the investments for
some annuities would produce excess revenues, which would help
support those annuities that over their lives did not produce investment
returns sufficient to pay monthly benefits based on a projected 5% rate
of return.

176. Note that the pension paid to a retiree with a defined benefit plan is affected by
neither the interest rate nor the expected rate of investment return prevailing at the time
of the commencement of the pension. This is consistent with the fuindamental feature of
a defined benefit plan-the investment risk is borne by the plan rather than the participant.
Maria O'Brien Hylton, Together We Can: Imagining the Future of Employee Pensions,
12 Emp. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 383, 386 (2008).
177. Calculations as reported by Free Annuity Rates at www.freeannuityrates.com
(last visited Apr. 19, 20 10).
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If FAIC were to sell annuities with a standard, minimum payout prior
to their retirement, employees could project how much their 401(k)
accounts would translate into for a monthly annuity payment. For
example, those anticipating retirement at age 65 would know long before
that date what they could expect as a minimum annuity benefit based on
what they estimate the value of their 401(k) to be when they reach age
65. Knowing the monthly annuity payout that their 40 1(k) could translate
into might cause them to save more, delay retirement, or might encourage
some to retire earlier. A fixed, minimum benefit could be expected to
become well-known, for example that a $100,000 annuity would pay
about $585 per month or $7020 per year. Some younger employees,
once they realize how little in retirement an income of $ 100,000 actually
is, might contribute more to their 401(k) accounts or save additional
amounts for retirement by, for example, contributing the maximum
78
allowed to Roth IRAs. 1

In times of interest rates and projected investment returns that are
higher than the projected guaranteed minimum, FAIC might offer
annuities that reflect some but not necessarily all of its ability to earn
greater returns on the investment proceeds from its sales of annuities.
By only offering modest increases in the amount of monthly benefits,
FAIC would be better able to subsidize annuities sold when the projected
rate of return was less than the amount needed to support the minimum
benefit. FAIC would also in essence step aside and allow private annuity
issuers to reclaim the market-by paying higher monthly benefits-for
those buyers who are willing to give up the security of a federally
backed annuity benefit and the other benefits that might be offered to
those who purchase FAIC-issued annuities.
FAIC might also offer modest inflation protection for purchasers of its
annuities. The monthly payout could be increased by a certain percentage
in the event that the increase in the consumer price index exceeded a
predetermined trigger level. For example, if the index rose over 6% over
a one-year period, the FAIC monthly annuity benefit would rise by 4%
with the benefit increase continuing in a two-to-three ratio if the rate of
178. Unlike contributions to a 401(k) account amounts contributed to a Roth IRA are
not deductible, but all distributions from a Roth IRA are tax-free, including the investment
income earned on the contributions to the account. I.R.C. § 408A (2006). To be eligible
to contribute to a Roth IRA, the individual must have countable income below a prescribed
dollar amount. Id The annual contribution to an IRA in 2009 was limited to $5000 for
taxpayers below age 50 and $6000 for those age 50 and above. Id. §§ 219, 408A (2006).
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inflation continued to grow.'179 Although not offering the complete
inflation protection enjoyed by Social Security recipients, whose annual
benefits rise with inflation,180 the partial protection would encourage the
purchase of annuities by those wary of locking their capital into what is
essentially a fixed-income investment.
The combination of absolute security that the annuity will be paid, a
guaranteed rate of projected investment return used to calculate the
benefit amount, and some inflation protection should overcome the
reluctance of many retirees to purchase an annuity with the rolled over
funds of their 40 1(k) plan.
Even with these inducements, many retirees might still not purchase
an annuity because they do not want to transmute capital-their
retirement IRAs-into a stream of income and so have nothing to leave
their heirs. The FAIC annuity, however, could be designed to address
this concern. As discussed, many annuities pay for either the longer of
the life of the annuitant-two lives in the case of a two-life annuity-or
for a minimum number of years, commonly ten. The FAIC annuity
could offer the same options. The guarantee, for example, of at least ten
years of payments would make the annuity more attractive to some
potential purchasers. More imaginatively, purchasers could have the
option to buy an annuity that would return a declining percentage of the
cost of the annuity upon the death of the annuitant. For example, FAIC
could agree to refund an amount equal to 50% of the purchase price if
the purchaser died within five years or 20% if the annuitant died within
ten years.18'1 The declining death benefit would result in the annuity

179. An increase in the Consumer Price Index of 6% or more is uncommon. The
last time that occurred was in 1990, when the increase was 6.1%. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2010), ftp://ftp.bls.gov/
pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai .txt. Prior to that the previous year with an increase of 6%
or more was 198 1. Id.
180. Automatic cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security benefits were adopted
in the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
181. The amount of a refund would have to balance the desire to increase the sale of
annuities against the need to lower monthly benefits in order to be able to finance the
partial refunds. The refund amount would also have to be calculated with consideration
to the problem of adverse selection; those most likely to die within ten years would be
those most often electing the refund option.
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paying smaller monthly benefits, but some potential purchasers would be
willing to accept that trade-off in order to preserve some of the value of
their estate in case they die before recovering their investment in the
annuity. In order to limit the cost of offering refunds, the amounts
repaid might be capped at a dollar amount, such as $200,000. The effect
might be to discourage retirees from investing more than $200,000 in an
annuity, but because only a small percentage of retirees would have that
much in a retirement IRA, a cap would affect only a small number of the
82
potential purchasers of FAIC annuities.'
Another way to guarantee a return of capital would be to offer the
option of life insurance payable at the death of the annuitant. Research
indicates that annuities have much greater appeal when perceived as
insurance rather than as an investment.183 The loss of wealth that an
annuitant incurs by dying before the projected life expectancy is a
significant deterrence to the purchase of annuities. When asked,
potential purchasers indicate a much higher likelihood of buying an
annuity if they are assured that their principal will be repaid to them
regardless of when they die. 184 To be sure, an annuity is a form of
insurance in that it guarantees income for life, but the insurance aspect
would be more apparent if the annuity were sold with insurance that paid
a death benefit. The insurance would initially pay the estate of the
purchaser of the annuity an amount equal to the cost of the annuity with
the death benefit declining over time to reflect the prior return of capital
in the form of the monthly annuity payments.'
The life insurance
would guarantee purchasers of FAIC annuities that they would recapture
the cost of the annuity if they were to die before their life expectancy.
The insurance would not have any medical precondition, enabling
purchasers of FAIC annuities to buy the insurance regardless of their
182. In 2004, among married couple households headed by individuals age 55 and
older, the median amount of all retirement accounts in the household was $119,500.
PATRICK PURtCELL & DEBRA B. W~rmi, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL3 3845, RETtREmENT
SAVINGS: How MUCH WILL WORKERS HAvE WHEN THEY RETIRE?

6, 8 tbl.3 (2007),

available at http://aging.senate.gov/crs/pension5.pdf.
183. PURCELL & ToPOLESKI, supra note 143, at 26.
184. BROWN ET AL., supra note 153, at 4; JEFFREY R. BROWN ET AL., TIAA-CREF
INST., RESEARCH DIALOGUE: FRAmING, REFERENCE POINTS, ANDI PREFERENCES FOR LIFE

ANNUITIES 4 (2008), available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.orglpdf/research/research_

dialogue/i 10108.pdf.
185. A monthly annuity payment reflects payment of investment earnings on the purchase
price and a return of a portion of the purchase price.
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health, with the only limit being that the annuitant would have to live a
minimum period of time, such as three years, in order to be eligible for
the death benefit. A minimum survival period would be necessary to
avoid the adverse selection problem of the sickest annuity buyers
disproportionately purchasing the life insurance. To keep the insurance
component affordable, it might be modestly subsidized on the premise
that helping to encourage the sale of annuities is critical to maintaining
the financial solvency of the elderly.
To reduce the cost of subsidies for these ancillary products, FAIC
could offer different kinds of annuities at different prices. A basic annuity
could be sold without any guarantees, refunds, or insurance. It would
provide the largest payout. As other guarantees, refunds, and insurance
were added, the payout would decrease-although not enough to fully
pay for the added benefit-or the annuities could be priced higher to
capture some or all of the cost of the additional benefits.
Another form of encouragement to buy a FAIC annuity would be to
grant relief from federal income taxes. Because the 401(k) account was
never subject to income tax and neither were the funds in a rollover IRA,
the distribution of funds from the IRA used to purchase of the annuity
would have to be exempted from taxation. To encourage the timely
purchase of an annuity, the tax exemption for the distribution to
purchase the annuity should only apply for a limited period, such as the
later of age 70 or within 90 days of separation from service of the
employer that sponsored the 401(k) plan. But the annuity could be
granted tax-free status, much like the treatment of a Roth IRA, so that all
or part of the distributions from the annuity would be tax-free.' 86 Absent
such tax relief all the payments received from an annuity purchased with
a tax-exempt 401(k) would be subject to income taxation. 187 To ensure
that the tax relief goes to those most in need, the tax exemption should

186. Proposed House Bill 2748 of the I111Ith Congress introduced by Congressman
Pomeroy would exclude from gross income up to 50% of annuity income up to a maximum
of $5000 for a single taxpayer and $10,000 for couples filing jointly. Retirement
Security Needs Lifetime Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 2748, 111Ith Cong. § 2 (2009).
187. I.R.C. § 72 (2006). Annuities purchased with previously taxed dollars can
exclude the return of the cost of the annuity from income taxation by use of the exclusion
formula. Id
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only apply so long as the annuitant's adjusted gross income or a
modified adjusted gross income, which includes other tax-free income
such as distributions from a Roth IRA or tax-free interest paid by
municipal bonds, is below a prescribed dollar limit. The latter is a way
of directing the benefit to those with more modest income and so avoids
providing a tax subsidy for those with higher incomes. The lower the
modified adjusted gross income, the greater the percentage of the
annuity that would be excluded from income taxation, much in the way
that Social Security benefits are wholly or partially exempt from income
taxing all or part of an FAIC annuity payment would be
taxati on. 18Not
an efficient way of promoting its sale. Though it would be very costly in
terms of lost tax revenue, total or partial relief from income taxation would
be a strong incentive to purchase an FAIC annuity.
X. CONCLUSION
In line with current federal laws that encourage and subsidize the
reliance on 401(k), 403(b), and 457(b) plans, the added benefit of
federally sponsored, minimum benefit annuities would encourage
employees to save more money for retirement and permit them to
convert those savings into lifetime income. Unfortunately, the current
reliance on retirees managing IRAs during their declining years exposes
them to excessive risks. Unless we relieve retirees of the burden of the
responsibility for their retirement assets, we can expect growing poverty
among the elderly as they mismanage and spend down their retirement
funds. The willful creation of a retirement system that relies on millions
of individuals age 80 and older successfully husbanding their limited
retirement funds can only be explained as the triumph of ideology over
common sense.
It is time to admit that what most retirees need is a stream of income
backed by the federal government so that they are assured of having a
check arrive every month regardless of their financial acumen or
physical and mental capabilities. The foundation for retirement income
should be the voluntary conversion of part or all of retirement plan
defined contribution accounts into guaranteed lifetime annuities that
reflect the reality that aging retirees need income protection, not financial
speculation.

188.
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See id. §86 (2006).

